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ABSTRACT
TATEVIK SEKHPOSYAN: Essays on Monetary Policy in the Euro Area.
(Under the direction of Neville Francis.)
The sequence of the essays in this thesis studies the differentials in inflation and output
growth across the Euro Area countries and addresses the role of monetary policy in explaining
these differentials. First I study the extent to which inflation and output growth differentials
are explained by the propagation of common monetary policy interventions. Next, I evaluate
the performance of the monetary authority in fulfilling the stabilization needs of the member
countries when it aims to stabilize the aggregate economy. Lastly, I empirically evaluate a
policy interest rule to determine the implicit weight the policymaker puts on the country-
specific inflation and output growth differentials in addition to the aggregate.
The results show that monetary policy interventions do not generate significant differences
in the inflation behavior across the countries, while they create significant differences in the
output dynamics. Moreover, monetary policy innovations do account for a large portion of
country-specific output fluctuations. This is in contrast to the business cycle literature where
only a small fraction of output variance is attributed to the monetary policy shocks. In addi-
tion, it appears that while targeting the aggregate inflation and output dynamics, monetary
authority stabilizes cross-country inflation in the face of idiosyncratic shocks fairly well, though
there are considerable differences in the welfare losses associated with the cross-country output
variability. Furthermore, country-specific inflation deviations are statistically significant in a
Taylor type policy feedback rule, while the aggregate output gap and country-specific output
gap differentials appear to be statistically insignificant.
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Chapter 1
Foreword
In 1989 the Delors Report proposed three stages for European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) that intended to create a single market in Europe. Stage 1 started on July 1,
1990 and aimed at completing internal markets and removing all obstacles to financial inte-
gration. The second stage initiated the creation of the EMU on January 1994, according to
which countries move from co-ordination of national policies to a common monetary policy. In
addition, countries are required to adhere to convergence criteria otherwise known as Maas-
tricht Criteria, which aimed for gradual convergence of inflation, interest rates, and exchange
rates, as well as threshold values for the government debt and deficit to GDP values among the
future members of the monetary union. On June 1998 the European Central Bank (ECB) and
the Eurosystem are set up, and by January of 1999 Stage 3 of the EMU begins. The exchange
rates of the 11 participating nations in terms of Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Nether-
lands (NL), and Portugal (PT) are fixed. Euro begins to trade on financial markets, and the
ECB takes the responsibility of the common monetary policy.
The initiation of the Euro Area (EA) started an intense debate in academic and policy
circles. Jonung and Drea (2010) summarize the literature in academia and central banks in
regards to the anticipated success of the Euro Area before its inception and in the first few
years of its operation. Figure C.1 captures the intensity of the literature, while Table B.1
summarizes the academic literature about EMU over the period of 1989-2002. As the table
suggests, the topical coverage for the academic papers varies: it extends from the design of
institutional structure, implementation of optimal fiscal policy, evaluation of the union as an
optimal currency area to its effects on international markets.
The conclusion of the literature has been skeptical. Given the asymmetry of the shocks,
structural differences across the countries in term of relative price responses and labor mobility,
as well as the non-existence of a central fiscal authority to implement an interregional transfer
program as a way of insuring against asymmetric shocks, the literature suggested that the
Eurozone does not qualify for an optimal currency area and would be unable to smooth out
the differences in the regional adjustment mechanism. The sequence of essays presented in
this thesis reevaluate the notion of optimal currency area in the Eurozone based on the decade
long economic performance of the Euro Area (EA).1
Having a monetary union presents a trade-off. On one hand there are efficiency gains on the
micro level from trade, since single currency reduces transaction costs. On the other hand this
gain in efficiency is contrasted with a loss of a country to conduct its independent monetary
policy. The presentation of this trade-off is clearly depicted in a John B. Taylor interview with
Milton Friedman as in Friedman (2001):
Taylor: Let me ask a question about monetary issues that relates to the global
economy. You have Europe’s new single currency, and you have Bob Mundell argu-
ing that we should have one world currency. You also have talk about dollarization
in Argentina and a greater commitment to floating in Brazil. Where is this all
going?
Friedman: From the scientific point of view, the Euro is the most interesting
thing. I think it will be a miracle–well, a miracle is a little strong. I think it’s highly
unlikely that it’s going to be a great success. It would be very desirable and I would
like to see it a success from a policy point of view, but as an economist, I think there
are real problems, arising in a small way now when you see the difference between
Ireland and Italy. You need different monetary policies for those two countries, but
1A thorough discussion and comparative studies for various aspects of regional adjustments in U.S., Euro
Area, and Canada can be found in Obstfeld and Peri (2000).
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you can’t have it with a single currency. Yet they are independent countries; you
are not going to have many Italians moving to Ireland or vice versa. So I do not
share Bob Mundell’s unlimited enthusiasm for the Euro. But it’s going to be very
interesting to see how it works. For example, I saw a study in which somebody
tried to ask the question, “What is the effect of having a common currency on the
volume of intercountry trade?” And the result was surprising. It was that having
a common currency had a surprisingly large effect, about four times the effect of
geographical proximity or of flexible exchange rates. Now that was just a small
sample.
In the thesis I concentrate only on the cost aspect of the currency union, i.e. what are
the losses associated with having a common monetary policy. More specifically, I evaluate the
country-level performance of the Eurozone economies under the euro regime. I think of a loss
in terms of cross country inflation and output growth differentials associated with monetary
policy innovations and the capacity of monetary policy to offset the idiosyncratic country-
specific disturbances. I then examine whether the cross country inflation and output growth
differentials are included in the information set of the ECB when setting monetary policy.
In other words, I consider a scenario where the countries matter to the policy interest rate
decision with different weights than their size suggests. The details of the thesis are presented
below.
In Chapter 2 I look at the differential adjustment mechanisms of the union-member coun-
tries upon a common monetary policy innovation. Looking at the monetary policy responses is
important from two respects. First and foremost, monetary policy innovations are important
since they imply a policy action. On the other hand, by looking at the responses to a common
shock enables us to quantify the structural differences across the countries and enables us to
look at the flexibility of the member economies to absorb various shocks. In addition, I look
at the systematic component of monetary policy and its ability to stabilize the union-member
economies in the face of idiosyncratic shocks when it in fact targets the aggregate economy.
In Chapter 3 I estimate a Taylor rule for the Euro Area, first under the assumption that
3
ECB targets the EA aggregate output gap and inflation, where the aggregates are constructed
by weighting the country-specific output and prices proportional to the country size. I then
estimate a Taylor rule, where I allow ECB to target the country-specific differentials in addition
to the aggregate variables. The relevance of this exercise is to find out whether the central
bank is aiming at stabilizing all member economies equally.
The chapters in this thesis have two important features. First, the analysis is conducted
based on data that captures the EA dynamics after the ECB took the responsibility of monetary
policy. Data coverage is a relevant issue due to the Lucas critique: by considering the time
period when currency union has been in place, I reduce the chance of model misspecification.
Second, I rely on Bayesian inference, which is appropriate from a methodological point of
view due to its small sample properties. In addition, the Bayesian inference provides with an
opportunity to incorporate the pre-euro dynamics for the post-euro analysis thus preventing
the loss of information. I accomplish the latter by parameterizing the prior consistent with
the pre-euro data and using that for inference.
Our findings are as follows.
I show that the monetary policy conducted by the ECB is relatively successful in stabilizing
the country-specific measures of consumer prices. The inflation response upon a common
monetary policy shock appears to be small and not-significantly different across the countries.
On the other hand, the burden of the economic realignment falls on the adjustment of output.
There appear to be persistent differences in the output response across the countries. Monetary
policy innovations in certain cases capture up to 60% of the business cycle variations.
The systematic component of the policy rule does in fact stabilize the cross-country inflation
variability in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks fairly well, though it fails to do so in regards
to output variability. In fact, the idiosyncratic shocks are best offset for France, and the worst
for Austria.
In regards to the Taylor rule, the European Central Bank responds to the fluctuations in
inflation expectations but not to the output gap. The policy feedback rule is well defined (in
accord to the Taylor Principle). There appears to be evidence that deviations of inflation from
the aggregate matter as well. The deviations of inflation for Spain and France mitigate the
4
policy response, while the deviations of Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands accentuate
the policy response suggesting a weighting matrix for the country-specific variables different
from the size of the economy.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: is
the Euro Good for All?
2.1 Introduction
Macroeconomists frequently treat the aggregate economy as a homogenous entity. Accordingly,
they analyze business cycle dynamics and evaluate macroeconomic policy outcomes on an
aggregate level with little or no emphasis on regional variations. This way of thinking builds
on the assumption that price and wage adjustment mechanisms within a country are flexible
and factors of production reasonably mobile.1 Therefore, misalignments in regional adjustment
are expected to be somewhat short-lived, and the economic consequences arising from such
disparities are thought to be negligible.
The welfare effects of unsynchronized regional adjustments have become a topic of heated
debate since 1999 when the European Central Bank (ECB) assumed responsibility of a common
monetary policy for the Euro Area. On one hand, variations in inflation and output across
member countries are considered to be necessary for economic adjustment (Lane (2006)). On
the other hand, persistent inflation and output growth differentials are thought to lead to
systematic resource misallocations, thus tempering long-run growth and exacerbating cross
1In other words, the asymmetries in regional realignment are often overlooked because the economy is
presumed to qualify for an optimal currency area, as highlighted in the seminal works of Mundell (1961) and
McKinnon (1963).
country differences (Blanchard and Summers (1987), Aghion and Howitt (2006)).
The intensification of the debate is partially due to the fact that there is a clearly defined
benchmark for a welfare comparison. The Euro Area members had independent central banks
with monetary policies that had the economic welfare of their sovereign countries as a main
objective. By entering the currency union, these countries agreed to the ECB objective of
union-wide price stability, which was defined as “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro Area below 2%” as opposed to their own
inflation and/or output (gap) stabilization policies.2
If the sources and magnitudes of the stochastic disturbances the member economies face
are not the same, a common monetary policy would be unable to stabilize the economies
at a national level. Moreover, if the structure of the member economies differ considerably,
monetary policy interventions can contribute to the business cycle differentials as well. This
in itself is not a concern if the economies of the member countries are flexible enough for
readjustment to occur quickly. However, various surveys of the current economic conditions
in the Euro Area provide evidence to the contrary.3
In this paper, I establish an empirical benchmark to address the extent to which the
propagation of common monetary policy can create differences in the dynamics of the output
and inflation across the countries. In addition, I assess the degree to which a common monetary
policy aimed at the stabilization of the union can stabilize the economies of individual members
in the face of idiosyncratic country-specific stochastic disturbances. I do so by postulating a
simple theoretical model, which in fact describes the most desirable situation, that is when
the union member countries are perfectly aligned. The theoretical model puts a structure on
the transmission channels by which an individual country relates to the union. I then take
the theoretical model to motivate the empirical specification and evaluate the country-specific
differences created by the union-wide monetary policy.
I find that the cross sectional variability of the inflation response upon a common monetary
2See October 13, 1998 ECB Press Release.
3See Economic Survey of the Euro Area, OECD Policy Brief, January 2007 and Report on the European
Economy, EEAG European Economic Advisory Group Report, February 2007 among others.
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policy shock is statistically insignificant. However, there are significant differences in the
output responses across the countries. The differences are both in magnitudes and timing of
the trough. In addition, there is a considerable variation in the proportion of the business cycle
fluctuations explained by a monetary policy shock across the countries. These variations range
from 2 percent to 70 percent for a two year period. In addition, a simulation exercise over
a twenty year horizon shows that in the face of idiosyncratic shocks ECB is more successful
in stabilizing the country-specific inflation variations and less successful in stabilizing output
variations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the motivation in
a greater detail. Section 2.3 relates the research question to the existing literature and data.
Section 2.4 postulates the theoretical model. Section 2.5 outlines the empirical specification.
Section 2.6 presents the econometric methodology. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 discuss our findings.
Subsequently, I conclude with propositions for further research.
2.2 Motivation
Figures 1a and 1b plot the average output growth and inflation differentials for the original
members of the Euro Area, that is Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain (ES),
Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL),
and Portugal (PT). The range for the average inflation rate is approximately 0.13 percentage
points, while the range for the average output growth stands at 0.42 percentage points. In
addition, differences in inflation and output growth are fairly persistent. The median country
with a level of output growth (inflation) below (above) that of the aggregate reported such
performance about 51 percent of the time.
The relative comovements of inflation and output growth are positive for a number of
countries indicating a demand-driven business cycle. For Netherlands and Ireland, the relative
measures of inflation and output growth are both positive on average, while for France both
measures are negative. Inflation and output growth comovements for the remaining eight
countries in the union are negative signaling that the country-level differences relative to
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the aggregate are overall due to either supply-side phenomena or to varying country-specific
demand (in)elasticities.
In evaluating the role of monetary policy in the observed differentials of inflation and output
growth, there are two important aspects. First, for the unexpected (discretionary) component
of monetary policy to have differential effects, there should be evidence of significant structural
heterogeneity across the countries. Second, for the systematic component of the union-wide
policy rule to have differential effects, in addition to structural heterogeneity, differences in the
sources and magnitudes of stochastic disturbances can also be a contributing factor. Further, I
consider the degree to which the systematic and discretionary components of monetary policy
factor in the union-wide dynamics.
2.3 Relation to the Existing Literature
There exists vast empirical literature that explores the differences in inflation and output
dynamics in the Euro Area. Most of this research was conducted prior to the ECB assuming
its responsibilities with a primary objective of forecasting the economic dynamics of potential
member countries after monetary integration was complete.4 Peersman (2004) provides a
comprehensive literature review and robustness analysis for the empirical literature based on
the pre-euro data. Though several studies considered in this paper find significant differences in
the magnitude and timing of the output and inflation responses across union member countries,
there is no consensus on the actual magnitudes, timing, or ranking of the differentials across
studies.
The theoretical literature (e.g., Benigno (2004) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008)), has mainly
concentrated on the formulation of the optimal monetary (and fiscal) policy in a currency area.
As such, it considers the optimal weights one needs to use in constructing the union-wide
aggregates in order to minimize the welfare loss associated with the structural heterogeneity.
In conducting an optimal monetary policy, the policymakers’ objective is to obviate structural
rigidities. Thus, this literature focuses on stabilization around a flexible price equilibrium
4See Mihov (2001) and Dornbusch et al. (1998) as examples of such works.
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and does not necessarily address the reasons of why and to what extent the flexible price
equilibrium might differ across countries.
Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) investigate the sources of heterogeneity within the Euro Area.
They estimate a multi-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for
the Euro Area. Since the estimated model is not very rich in structure, it leans towards
accepting the hypothesis of stochastic heterogeneity (i.e., asymmetry in the shocks) as opposed
to structural heterogeneity.5
Furthermore, there is an extensive discussion about the various aspects of the economic
structure in which the Euro Area member countries differ. The labor and product market
rigidities in particular have received considerable attention. Alesina et al. (2008) conclude
that the pace of structural reforms in the product market has intensified with the adoption
of the euro, while that is not the case for the primary labor markets.6 Dhyne, A´lvarez,
Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Hoffmann, Jonker, Lu¨nnemann, Rumler, and Vilmunen (Dhyne et al.)
calculate the median frequency of price changes from product level data for several Euro
Area member countries. Based on their calculations, Italy exhibits a greatest degree of price
stickiness, while Portugal exhibits the lowest degree of price stickiness: the implied durational
difference between the two is about five months. Waddington and Hoffmann (2003) show
that countries vary considerably with trade union membership rates, while the numbers for
collective bargaining coverage are less variable. The unionized share of employed is the smallest
in France, while it is quite high in Finland. However, even in France, 90 percent of the employed
are covered by some version of collective bargaining. A higher degree of labor and product
market rigidities imply a more persistent inflation process, putting the pressure on output in
the adjustment process.
In its approach to evaluate the effect of monetary policy on inflation and output differentials
across the Euro Area countries, the paper most closely associated with our work is Boivin
5Their model does not include labor market rigidities, which are very important for the Euro Area.
6The findings are consistent with the Economic Survey of the Euro Area in 2007 as the OECD Policy
Brief states: “The early years of monetary union have shown that less flexible economies can have a rough
ride, missing out on the full benefits of the single currency. Structural rigidities tend to reduce growth, make
inflation more persistent and reduce the economys ability to absorb shocks.”
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et al. (2008). They assess how the introduction of the euro changed the monetary policy
transmission mechanism for the Euro Area countries. The results are particularly important
given that the inference relies on post-euro data. By estimating a factor-augmented VAR
model, Boivin et al. (2008) show that the effects of the monetary policy have become less
important and more homogeneous for all real variables except for the real effective exchange
rates and trade as the euro was introduced. The convergence of the long-term interest rates
as well as the elimination of the intra-union exchange rate risk appear to be the main reasons
for the harmonization of the policy effects.
This paper is similar to Boivin et al. (2008) in that it relies on post-euro data for inference.
However, it differs from Boivin et al. (2008) in that it takes a more standard structural VAR
approach to the estimation. Although factor-augmented VAR models provide fairly accurate
forecasts, it is usually difficult to associate a particularly important factor with a variable
regularly observed in the economy. In addition, aside from the monetary policy disturbances,
I assess the importance of the systematic component of the monetary policy in the observed
inflation and output differentials as well. This is important since the contribution of monetary
policy disturbances to the business cycle fluctuations is small as documented for example in
Sims and Zha (2006).
2.4 A Theoretical Model of a Currency Union
The theoretical setup considers a currency union that consists, without loss of generality, of
two open economies and a union-wide monetary policy authority. The countries share a similar
structure in that they can be described with the same type of preferences and frictions. First,
I postulate a model of an open economy that is a member of the currency union. Then, I look
at aggregation and union-wide dynamics.
Each individual economy is modeled in the spirit of small open economies described in Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005) and Erceg et al. (2007). Each country has a monopolistically competitive
intermediate goods sector, which implies control over price setting. In addition, there is “home-
bias” in the preferences of the households for the domestically produced consumption good.
11
Our model is different from Erceg et al. (2007) in that there is no staggered wage adjustment.
In these models the world is exogenous and each economy relates to the world under the
assumption that it has no effect on it. In our model I relax the small open economy aspect of
the dynamics. Instead of the world, I model a union which is not exogenous to countries, but
rather the union is comprised of countries. The latter makes it possible for each union-member
country to affect the union dynamics. In addition, this is a currency union model, and as such
the law of one price and the effects of nominal exchange rate movements are not considered.
2.4.1 Modeling the Individual Economies
Households
The representative household in an open economy chooses a bundle of consumption goods,
hours worked, quantity of one-period riskless bond holdings, and money holdings ({Ct, Lt, Dt,Mt}∞t=0)
to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
(2.1)
subject to
U
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)
=
C1−σt
1− σ +
(Mt/Pt)
1−ν
1− ν −
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
(2.2)
PtCt +QtDt +Mt ≤ Dt−1 +Mt−1 +WtLt + Γt + Tt (2.3)
lim
T→∞
Et{DT +MT } ≥ 0, (2.4)
where Pt is the price of consumption goods and Wt is the nominal wage. Each risk-free
bond pays one unit of money at maturity, and its price is Qt. Tt is the value of lump-sum
transfers/taxes in nominal terms, and Γt is the profit of all the domestic firms. Ponzi-type
schemes are outruled by equation (2.4).
The consumption bundle of the representative household consists of domestically produced
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(CH, t) and imported (CF, t) goods, aggregated by the following preferences
Ct = [(1− α)
1
η (CH, t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF, t)
η−1
η ]
η
η−1 , (2.5)
where η > 0 measures the substitutability of domestic and foreign goods and α ∈ [0, 1] measures
the households relative preference for foreign (imported) goods.
Pt = [(1− α)(PH, t)1−η + α(PF, t)1−η]
1
1−η (2.6)
I define the aggregate price index by (2.6), where PH, t and PF, t define the prices of domestic
and foreign goods (in the same currency), respectively. Consequently, the optimal allocation
of consumption expenditures yields the following derived demand schedules for the aggregate
domestic and imported goods.
CH, t = (1− α)
(
PH, t
Pt
)−η
Ct CF, t = α
(
PF, t
Pt
)−η
Ct (2.7)
The relevant first-order conditions from the household optimization are given by the Euler
equation (2.8), labor supply (2.9), and money demand (2.10) schedules. The demand for bond
holdings is determined by the budget constraint (2.3). I rewrite the Euler equation in terms
of the gross risk-free interest rate Rt, which is the reciprocal of Qt.
βEtRt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1 (2.8)
Cσt L
ϕ
t =
Wt
Pt
(2.9)
Cσt
(
Rt
Rt − 1
)
=
(
Mt
Pt
)ν
(2.10)
Firms
There are two types of firms in this economy: firms producing domestic intermediate goods and
firms producing domestic finished goods. The intermediate goods sector is monopolistically
competitive, while the final goods sector is perfectly competitive.
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Final Goods Producers
The domestic final goods producing representative firm buys Yt(i) of each intermediate
good i ∈ [0, 1] for a nominal price PH, t(i) in each period t to produce a final good Yt. It uses
constant-return-to-scale technology, such that
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(θt−1)
θt di
] θt
(θt−1)
, (2.11)
where θt is the time-varying elasticity of demand for each intermediate good. The final good
producing sector maximizes its profit yielding in the following first-order condition
Yt(i) =
(
PH, t(i)
PH, t
)−θt
Yt, (2.12)
where PH, t =
[∫ 1
0 PH, t(i)
1−θtdi
] 1
(1−θt) .
Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods i ∈ [0, 1], each produced by a monopolistically
competitive firm. Each firm uses identical technology and produces its differentiated good by
the following
Yt(i) = AtLt(i). (2.13)
Firms maximize their profit by taking the demand schedules expressed in equation (2.12), the
domestic aggregate price level (PH, t), as well as the domestic aggregate output level (Yt) as
given. In addition, prices are sticky. The latter is implemented by the mechanism proposed
by Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996): in each period a firm may reset its price with probability
1−φ. Thus, overall in the economy, in each period 1−φ, intermediate good producers change
their prices, while φ fraction keeps it unchanged.
The input markets that the intermediate goods producers face are competitive, so each
firm chooses its labor input Lt(i), taking the aggregate wage index Wt as given. In addition,
the labor is completely mobile in each country.
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Given the assumptions, the i-th intermediate-good-producing firm’s problem at time t (if
it can reset its price) is to choose P ∗H, t(i) in order to maximize
∞∑
k=0
φkEt
[
Qt, t+k(P
∗
H, t(i)Yt+k(i)− Φt+k(Yt+k(i)))
]
, (2.14)
subject to a sequence of demand schedules
Yt+k(i) =
(
P ∗H, t(i)
PH, t+k
)−θt
Yt+k, (2.15)
where Qt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs as in equation (2.3) and Φt(.)
is the cost function.
The first-order condition yields
∞∑
k=0
φkEt
[
Qt, t+kYt+k(i)
(
P ∗H, t(i)−
θt
θt − 1Φ
′
t+k(Yt+k(i))
)]
= 0, (2.16)
where Φ′t+k(.) is the marginal cost. When there are no frictions; that is φ = 0, the first-order
condition becomes P ∗H, t(i) =
θt
θt−1Φ
′
t+k(Yt+k(i)), which gives
θt
θt−1 = νt an interpretation of
desired markup levels.
The cost minimization of the intermediate goods producers yields an identical marginal
cost for all firms defined by
Φ′t+k(Yt+k(i)) =
Wt+k
At+k
. (2.17)
Let MCt+k =
Φ′t+k(Yt+k(i))
PH, t+k
be the real marginal cost in terms of domestic prices. Under the
assumption that when firms reoptimize they choose the same price, that is P ∗H, t(i) = P
∗
H, t, I
can rewrite the firm’s first-order condition (2.16) as
∞∑
k=0
φkEt
[
Qt, t+kYt+kPH, t+k
(
P ∗H, t
PH, t+k
)−θt ( P ∗H, t
PH, t+k
− νtMCt+k
)]
= 0. (2.18)
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Let x1t be the discounted present value of the marginal revenue
Ptx
1
t =
∞∑
k=0
φkEtQt, t+kYt+kPH, t+k
(
P ∗H, t
PH, t+k
)−θt P ∗H, t
PH, t+k
, (2.19)
and x2t be the discounted present value of the marginal cost
Ptx
2
t =
∞∑
k=0
φkEtQt, t+kYt+kPH, t+k
(
P ∗H, t
PH, t+k
)−θt
νtMCt+k, (2.20)
Let P˜H, t = P
∗
H, t/PH, t and ΠH, t+1 = PH, t+1/PH, t. I can rewrite equations (2.19) and
(2.20) recursively as
x1t = Yt(P˜H, t)
1−θt + φEtQt, t+1
(
P˜H, t
P˜H, t+1
)1−θt
ΠθtH, t+1x
1
t+1 (2.21)
x2t = Yt(P˜H, t)
−θtMCtνt + φEtQt, t+1
(
P˜H, t
P˜H, t+1
)−θt
Πθt+1H, t+1x
2
t+1, (2.22)
then restate (2.18) as x1t = x
2
t .
Fiscal Policy
The government purchases some of the domestically produced good Gt, and every period
balances its budget by lump-sum taxes
Gt = Tt. (2.23)
Equilibrium
Market clearing the goods market requires
Yt = CH, t +Gt +Xt, (2.24)
where Xt is the level of exports, that is the domestically produced goods acquired by the
foreign consumers.
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Labor market clearing implies
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di. (2.25)
The money market clearing implies
Mt = M
s
t . (2.26)
The equilibrium bond holdings in the economy is zero, that is Dt = 0.
Aggregation
Given that in each period 1 − φ proportion of the firms change their price and set it equal
to P ∗H, t and φ proportion of the firms do not reset their prices and keep it at PH, t−1, the
aggregate inflation will be
ΠH, t =
[
1
φ
− 1− φ
φ
(P˜H, t)
1−θt
]θt−1
. (2.27)
If I let
kt =
∫ 1
0
(
PH, t(i)
PH, t
)θt
di, (2.28)
then I can show the following to hold
kt = (1− α)(P˜H, t)−η − αΠηH, tkt−1. (2.29)
By combining equations (2.12), (2.13), and (2.25) and integrating, I get
AtLt = Ytkt. (2.30)
Stochastic Processes
The labor productivity in each country follows a random walk defined by
At = At−1eat , (2.31)
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where at is a serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic country-specific productivity shock that has
a normal distribution, at ∼ N(0, σa). In addition, At > 1 for all t.
As revealed by equation (2.15), −θt measures the time-varying elasticity of the demand for
the intermediate goods. As shown in Ireland (2007), the shocks to θt translate into markup
shocks for the intermediate goods producers and have the interpretation of cost push shocks
in equilibrium. I assume the time-varying elasticity follows a stationary stochastic process
θt = (θt−1)ρθeθt , (2.32)
where θt ∼ N(0, σθ) and θt > 1 for all t.
In each economy, the government purchases follow a stationary stochastic process
Gt = (Gt−1)ρgegt , (2.33)
where gt is a serially uncorrelated country-specific shock to government purchases that follows
a normal distribution, gt ∼ N(0, σg).
2.4.2 Modeling the Union-wide Dynamics
I consider a monetary union that consists of two countries with an isomorphic structures, as
specified above. The variables pertaining to each country are marked with an appropriate
superscript. The union itself is closed to the rest of the world. Labor is immobile across
countries. The international risk sharing condition holds. The monetary policy authority
aims at the stabilization of the aggregate (union-wide) economy, as opposed to stabilizing the
economies of the member countries directly.
International Risk Sharing
I assume that the representative households in each country start with identical initial con-
ditions. By construction, it is true that P
(1)
F,t = P
(2)
H,t and P
(1)
F,t = P
(2)
H,t. There is a complete
securities market that implies the same pricing kernel for each country. Accordingly, I can
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derive the international risk-sharing condition as
C
(1)
t = C
(2)
t h(St)
1
σ(1−η) , (2.34)
where St is the terms of trade, St =
PF, t
PH, t
and h(S) = ((1− α)S1−ηt + α)/((1− α) + αS1−ηt ).
In accord with the definition of the terms of trade, I can rewrite (2.6) as follows
Pt
PH, t
= ((1− α) + αS1−ηt )
1
1−η . (2.35)
Market Clearing in the Union
In order for the union to be at an equilibrium, the following relations need to hold
X(1) = C
(2)
F, t X
(2) = C
(1)
F, t. (2.36)
Aggregate Inflation, Output, and Money Supply
The union-wide inflation and output dynamics are aggregated from the country-specific infla-
tion and output dynamics using exogenously defined weights w and 1− w
Y ut = Y
(1) w
t Y
(2) (1−w)
t (2.37)
Πut = Π
(1) w
t Π
(2) (1−w)
t . (2.38)
Money supply in the union adjusts to accommodate the money demand for each individual
country. Consistent with the money market clearing condition listed before (equation [2.26]),
the money supply for the union will be
Mut = M
(1)
t +M
(2)
t . (2.39)
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Monetary Policy
The monetary policy authority stabilizes the aggregate output and inflation by the following
feedback rule
Rt = (Π
u
t )
φpi(Y ut )
φye
u
rt , (2.40)
where urt is the monetary policy disturbance coming from a normal distribution, 
u
rt ∼ N(0, σur ).
2.4.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Member Country Dynamics
With the setup described in section 2.4.1, the equilibrium dynamics of a country that is a
member of a currency union can be described by 21 equations that determine the following
endogenous variables
{Ct, CH, t, CF, t,Πt,ΠH, t, St, kt, Lt, Yt, Xt,Mt, Tt, Dt,Γt, x1t , x2t ,MCt,Wt, At, θt, Gt},
where all variables are as defined previously, and Πt = Pt/Pt−1.
I impose a symmetric, non stochastic (perfect foresight) steady state for the member
economies, where the preferences for the countries are identical. The steady state is described
in section A.1 of the Appendix.
In order to solve and analyze the dynamic stochastic model described above, I use a first-
order Taylor approximation to approximate the nonlinear equations describing the equilibrium
dynamics of the member economy with log-linear ones. The derivation of the relevant equa-
tions, that is equations determining the state variables of the model, are provided in section
A.2 of the Appendix.
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The following six equations describe the dynamics of a member economy
yt = Etyt+1 − (1− gy)
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) + gy(gt − Etgt+1) + α(1− gy)κ(st − Etst+1)(2.41)
st =
yt − gygt − (y∗t − gyg∗t )
(1− gy)σα (2.42)
piH, t = βEtpiH, t+1 + λ1mct + λ2θˆt (2.43)
mct =
σ + ϕ(1− gy)
1− gy yt −
σ
1− gy gygt − α(σκ− 1)st − (1 + ϕ)at (2.44)
pit = pit, H + αst (2.45)
mt =
σ
ν
(yt − gygt)
(1− gy) −
σψ
ν
st − ηrt. (2.46)
Equations (2.41) and (2.42) describe the “open-economy” IS curve, equations (2.43) and (2.44)
describe the Phillips curve. Equation (2.45) defines the consumer price index, while equation
(2.46) describes the dynamics of the real money balances in the economy. The variables with
asterisks (*) pertain to the foreign country, which in this case, by construction, is the second
country in the union.
The stochastic disturbances (in a log-linear form) are
at = at−1 + at (2.47)
θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 + θt (2.48)
gt = ρggt−1 + gt. (2.49)
Union
The log-linear dynamics of the output, inflation, interest rate, and real money balances in the
union evolves according to the following
yut = wy
(1)
t + (1− w)y(2)t (2.50)
piut = wpi
(1)
t + (1− w)y(2)t (2.51)
rt = φ1y
u
t + φ2pi
u
t + e
u
rt (2.52)
mut = 0.5m
(1)
t + 0.5m
(2)
t + (w − 0.5)st. (2.53)
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2.4.4 DSGE versus VAR
VAR Representation
Under a maintained hypothesis that the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is cor-
rectly parameterized, the linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics of the model can
be described with recursive laws of motion, where the endogenous and endogenous state vari-
ables are expressed in terms of the predetermined variables and exogenous stochastic processes.
Appendix A.4 describes the solution in terms of the recursive equilibrium laws of motion per-
taining to our currency area model.7
Let Zt = [xt zt]
′, where xt = [y
(1)
t pi
(1)
t y
(2)
t pi
(2)
t ]
′ is the vector of endogenous state variables,
and zt = [m
(1)
t m
(2)
t y
u
t pi
u
t m
u
t rt]
′ is the vector of endogenous variables. I can rewrite the
recursive equilibrium laws of motion obtained in the appendix in the following state-space
form
Zt = AZt−1 +Bvt (2.54)
vt = Nvt−1 + t, (2.55)
where A = [0] and B = [Q S]′.
Equation (2.56) describes the dynamic motion of the observables in terms of the seven latent
variables evolving by equation (2.57). Our system is singular in the form provided because the
union is a weighted average of the member countries. I drop the variables pertaining to one
of the countries and proceed with a system describing the dynamics of a member country and
the union. In other words, I modify the system to be
Z˜t = A˜Z˜t−1 + B˜vt (2.56)
vt = Nvt−1 + t, (2.57)
7By assumption the requirements of the saddle path hold.
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where Z˜t = [x˜t z˜t]
′. Omitting the country-specific superscripts, I can rewrite the observable
variables as x˜t = [yt pit]
′ and z˜t = [mt yut piut mut rt]′. Consequently, A˜ and B˜ would be
the appropriate partitions of the original matrices A and B that correspond to the set of
observables considered in the new system.8 Since B−1 exists and the number of shocks are
equal to the number of observables, the VAR representation exists and is equivalent to Z˜t =
(BNB−1)Z˜t−1 +Bt = ΓZ˜t−1 +ut. In the last equation, ut = Bt is a rotation of the structural
shocks t.
Identification
The fact that the DSGE model has a VAR representation essentially implies that the reduced
form shocks ut span the space of structural shocks. However, invertibility of the VAR does
not imply identification. In the process of the estimation, inference about B is made through
the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the reduced form errors ut. The latter gives k(k + 1)/2
(in our case k = 7) equations to estimate k2 parameters. Thus, further restrictions need to be
imposed on the matrix B in order to achieve identification.
The literature has approached identification through various routes. Christiano et al.
(1999) establish the empirical benchmark for the monetary policy propagation through short-
run restrictions. Starting from the seminal work of Blanchard and Quah (1989), there has been
an extensive use of the long-run restriction in the VAR literature. Sign restrictions are intended
to choose identification consistent with the patterns of the theoretical models as discussed in
Uhlig (2005). However, there seems to be no consensus in the appropriate identification of
structural disturbances from reduced-form residuals.
Since the main objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of monetary policy, I follow
the more traditional choice of the monetary literature and impose short-run restrictions on the
VAR motivated by the theoretical model highlighted before. A careful observation of equations
(2.41)–(2.46) and (2.50)–(2.51) shows that the innovations to the interest rate are orthogonal
8In fact, since A is a matrix of zeros, dropping some of the endogenous state variables does not cause a
problem because the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a finite order VAR representation stated
in the corollary 2.2 of Ravenna (2007) is satisfied.
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to the rest of the system. In addition, while domestic and foreign demand-side disturbances (gt
and g∗t respectively) have a contemporaneous impact throughout the whole dynamic system,
the impact of the cost push shocks (θˆt) is apparent in the dynamics of the inflation measures
only. In addition, interest rates only respond to the union-wide variables contemporaneously.9
I keep this identification scheme in mind when I proceed with the empirical exercise.
2.5 An Empirical Model of a Currency Union
The empirical model of the currency union is postulated in terms of a structural VAR of the
following form
z′tA = C
′ +
p∑
l=1
z′t−lAl + 
′
t, ∀t = 1, ..., T, (2.58)
where A and Al are n × n parameter matrices, C is an n × 1 vector of constant parameters,
zt is an n × 1 vector of endogenous variables at t, and t is an n × 1 vector of structural
shocks at t. T is the sample size, while p denotes the lag length of the endogenous variables
in the VAR selected through BIC.10 The structural errors are independently and identically
distributed normal variables with 0 mean and unit variance, t ∼ N(0n×1, In×n). A is assumed
to be non-singular. The term structural in this context is used to indicate the theoretical
restrictions imposed on the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients (A and Al, respectively),
and, as such, the restrictions are motivated by the theoretical model considered previously.
As implied by the theory, the empirical model consists of country-specific and union-wide
variables. However, the structural VAR is augmented with worldwide variables to capture
the open economy aspects of the currency union and commodity prices to accommodate the
forward-looking nature of the policy maker. More specifically, the general structure of the
9I interpret the timing restrictions implied by the model loosely. In essence the system is simultaneous at
time t, thus all the shocks exhibit their effect in the dynamics of the system contemporaneously. In addition, I
concentrate on the cost push shocks because technology shocks have a permanent effect on the system described
above, which can not be captured with short-run restrictions.
10I conduct the BIC lag length selection by allowing a maximum of six lags in order to have reasonable degrees
of freedom. In all instances the lag length chosen is equal to one.
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dynamic process expressed in (2.58) is restricted to the following
A′ =

D11 0 0 0 0 0
A21 A22 0 0 0 0
A31 A32 A33 0 0 0
A41 0 A43 A44 0 0
A51 A52 A53 A54 A45 0
A61 A62 A63 A64 A65 A66

, yt =

wt
cst
ust
upt
cft
uft

.
Here, the variables are divided into world variables wt, country-specific, slow moving vari-
ables cst, union-specific, slow-moving variables ust, policy instrument of the union upt, country-
specific fast moving variables cft, and union-specific, fast-moving variables uft. Moreover, D11
is a diagonal matrix, which together with the zero restrictions yields the vector of the world
variables to be exogenous to the union and its member contemporaneously.
I consider wt = {∆pcomt, ipiwt , rwt }, where pcomt is a world commodity price index. I use
seasonally adjusted U.S. industrial production index for the world output expressed by ipiwt .
The effective federal funds rate rwt proxies the world interest rate. The country-specific output
(measured with a seasonally adjusted IPI) and inflation (measured with a first difference in
a seasonally adjusted harmonized index of consumer prices [HICP]) are treated as country-
specific, slow-moving variables, cst = {ipit, ∆cpit}. The union-specific, slow-moving variables
are measured in seasonally adjusted Euro Area wide IPI and HICP, ust = {ipieat , ∆cpieat }. The
policy instrument is reat – interest rate on the main refinancing operations. In the benchmark
specification, I set cft = m1− cpi and uft = m1ea − cpiea, that is the seasonally adjusted M1
values (adjusted for prices) for the country and the union, though I consider an alternative set
of fast moving variables in the robustness section. All the variables, except the interest rates
are in logarithms.
The zero restrictions in the contemporaneous matrix A are consistent with our division
of the variables into various categories. In addition, in accord with the theoretical model, I
impose a lower triangular structure on A22. The resulting system is overidentified. Among
the identified shocks, the ones that are of particular interest are the monetary policy and the
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country-specific demand and cost-push shocks. In addition, I restrict the lag coefficients such
that the behavior of the interest rates is determined by the world or union variables, and the
country-specific variables have no effect. This restriction is consistent with the theory and can
yield an identical policy response for various iterations of the estimation.
Since the main objective of this paper is analyzing the differences in the performance of
the Euro Area countries, a benchmark should be defined. In order to compare the country
performance to the overall union performance, I run a VAR for the whole union and take the
appropriate metrics of this VAR as a benchmark for comparison. The VAR that considers the
dynamics of only the union is similar to the one specified above. The variables included in the
union VAR are yt = [wt ust upt uft]
′. The restrictions on the contemporaneous and lagged
coefficients continue to hold.
The data cover the 11 original members of the Euro Area, that is Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal. The
data are in monthly frequencies, and the final sample includes the period 1999:1–2008:12. All
variables, except the commodity price index, are taken from Eurostat. Money supply data
specific to each country for the period considered are not readily available and are constructed
from the central banks’ balance sheet activities. Due to comparable data limitations, I use
the value of total deposit liabilities of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) as a measure of
money supply. In addition, the data for HICP and total deposit liabilities provided by Euro-
stat are not seasonally adjusted. I seasonally adjust the series by X-11 filtering. Commodity
prices are the average valuation of the commodity dollar index in euros obtained from Global
Financial Data.
2.6 Estimation Methodology
Since our empirical model captures the dynamics of an individual member country with the
union, I need to conduct the exercise separately for each country. I employ Bayesian methodol-
ogy, where I estimate the system provided in (2.58) by imposing a prior on the VAR coefficients,
combine it with a likelihood function to get the posterior distribution, and draw from that
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posterior. Taking a Bayesian approach in this context has two contributions. The imposition
of the prior reduces the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) of the model by decreasing the
bias and increasing the efficiency of estimated coefficients.
It is well known that in the presence of unit roots classical methods underestimate the
parameters and bias models toward stationarity in small samples. In general, this is true
for inferences based on conditional (on initial observations) likelihood where the weight on
initial observations, which can be far from model’s steady state, is fairly high.11 One way
the literature has approached resolving this issue is by augmenting the econometric models
with pseudo observations (usually referred to as ”dummy” observations) that incorporate the
beliefs about the steady state of the model and put low probability on the initial observations
that are further from the model’s steady state. This is in general implemented in the spirit of
the Theil mixed estimation, which is discussed in more detail in Sims and Zha (1998).
In addition, in a high dimensional space, the prior imposes extra structure on the empirical
model, which results in efficiency gains for the estimated coefficients. In other words, the prior
shrinks the parameter space such that overfitting is minimized, while the information contained
in the sample is preserved. As a result, the MSFE is improved, and models perform better
in out-of-sample forecasting exercises. This improved forecasting performance has long been
shown by Doan et al. (1984) and Litterman (1986). Further, Banbura et al. (2008) demonstrate
that under an adequate rate of shrinkage the improved predictability still holds even when the
systems are very large.
I will estimate a structural Bayesian VAR based on an algorithm provided by Waggoner
and Zha (2003). The algorithm enables us to estimate a structural VAR directly. This is
in contrast to the two-step procedure commonly used in the literature, where in the first
stage a reduced form is estimated and then the structural component is uncovered from the
reduced form variance-covariance matrix by a second-stage maximum likelihood procedure.
The second stage is most frequently performed by a Choleski decomposition and achieves an
exact identification of the VAR. Sims and Zha (1998) show that the second-stage procedure
11See Sims (2000) and the references therein for a more thorough discussion.
27
does not uncover the proper distributional properties of the structural relationships unless
the system is just identified. In addition, this algorithm enables us to obtain a measure of
uncertainty in a more natural way.
2.6.1 Prior
I can rewrite the system in (2.58) as
y′tA = x
′
tF + 
′
t, (2.59)
where the columns of the matrices A and F denoted by ai and fi pertain to a separate structural
equation in the system and i = 1, ..., n.
I impose a prior of the following form
ai ∼ N(0, S¯i) and fi|ai ∼ N(P¯iai, H¯i). (2.60)
The structural equations are assumed to be independent. Similar to Waggoner and Zha
(2003), I center the multivariate normal random vectors ai around zero and specify the standard
deviation as S¯ijj = λ0/σj .
The prior that guides the overall dynamics of the system is a Sims and Zha (1998) random
walk prior. Essentially, the prior is parameterized such that the conditional mean of the first
lag coefficient is equal to ai and the rest to zero. The standard deviation of each coefficient
on lag p in equation i for variable j is determined by H¯ijj =
λ0λ1
σjpλ3
, for j = 1, ..., k − 1. The
prior standard deviation for the constant is H¯ijj = λ0λ4, for j = k. σj is included in order to
account for different units of measurement of the variables. The hyperparemeter values and
their description is provided in Table B.2.
In addition, I impose what has come to be known in the literature as inexact priors. These
priors are usually introduced in terms of initial ”dummy” observations in the data matrix.12
12In essence, the initial dummy observations ensure that the likelihood function used in forming the posterior is
an unconditional likelihood as opposed to a likelihood conditioned on the initial observations. This is particularly
important because it is well documented that for time-series data the unconditional likelihood puts a lot of weight
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The types of the data observations introduced and the weight put on these observations impose
different beliefs about the behavior of the system in general. The particular type of the inexact
priors I consider are the unit-root and cointegration priors. The details on these priors are
provided in Appendix A.4, and the values of the hyperparameters are in Table 1.
A few words about the prior are needed here. The random walk prior is essentially a
hierarchical prior, which constrains the coefficients to be drawn from the same distribution.
The hyperparemeters are selected in line with the common values used in the literature, for
example, as discussed in Robertson and Tallman (1999). However, while conducting inferences
in small samples, the role of the prior is not trivial.
The benchmark estimation is conducted based on a prior that is parameterized the same
across the countries. This choice is motivated by the fact that all the countries in the Euro
Area should satisfy the Maastricht criteria of economic convergence, which implies that the
key nominal economic variables for the countries were within a narrow range at the start of the
union. However, it is indeed possible that certain countries had to undergo more changes in
order to meet the convergence criteria, and the inertia of the reforms would display themselves
after the adoption of the euro. Thus, it is essential to test the degree to which the imposed
symmetry across the countries through the prior drive our empirical results. I attempt this in
the robustness section.
2.6.2 Sampler
I postulate the theoretical restrictions considered previously in a form of linear restrictions on
matrices A and F. Consistent with the restrictions, I get orthonormal rotation matrices Ui and
Vi such that ai = Uibi and fi = Vigi. In essence, the rotation matrices squeeze the parameter
space by reducing its dimensionality in accord with the linear restrictions imposed. Combining
on the initial observations, which results in a stationarity bias when the considered sample size is small. For
example, if one writes the regular OLS estimation procedure in terms of recursive least squares (RLS), it would
be clear that in order to achieve the OLS results one needs to put less and less weight on the new observations
as time progresses. The gain from observing an additional data point becomes negligible eventually, which in
econometric terms means that I have asymptotic results. Thus, if the sample is small, the weight on the initial
observations are relatively large, and they become potent to drive the results and would particularly bias the
results towards stability.
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the prior in (2.60) with the likelihood, I get marginal posterior pdfs for bi and gi defined by
p(b1, ..., bm|X,Y ) ∝ |det[U1b1|...|Umbm]|T exp
(
−T
2
n∑
i=1
b′iS
−1
i bi
)
(2.61)
p(gi|bi, X, Y ) = ϕ(Pibi, Hi), (2.62)
where Hi, Pi, and Si are transformations of the prior mean and variance matrices H¯i, P¯i, and
S¯i.
The distribution of the contemporaneous elements is nonstandard. I use the Gibbs sampler
to simulate from that distribution. The details of the sampler are discussed in Geweke (1999)
and Robert and Casella (1999) among others. The results presented further are based on 10,000
accumulated draws. The initial 5,000 draws are discarded to eliminate the effects of the algo-
rithm initialization. The implied conditional posterior distribution of the lagged coefficients
fi is normal, making it straightforward to draw from its posterior after the contemporaneous
matrix is uncovered.
2.7 The Effects of Monetary Policy - Results
I approach analyzing the effects of the common monetary policy from two angles. First I
analyze the potency of monetary policy interventions in creating differences in the output and
inflation across the Euro Area countries. Second, I evaluate the degree to which the systematic
part of the common monetary policy can explain the differences.
Figures C.4 and C.5 look at the impulse response functions of output and inflation for
each country upon one standard deviation (15 basis points) contractionary common monetary
shock. The figures show the modal (based on the mode of the parameter distributions) impulse
responses of output and inflation of each country in the sample and contrast it with the
aggregate output and inflation responses of the Euro Area. The differences in the level of
the output across member countries are considerably large with a maximum difference of
1.17 percentage points. However, the recovery after a contractionary monetary policy shock
occurs about the same time with the range for the start of the recovery times being about
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six months. For the majority of the countries, the recovery of output is lagging the recovery
of the aggregate output. The range of the inflation differentials across the countries reaches
0.04 percentage point at the maximum. There are considerable differences in the timing of
the inflation dynamics reversals, which ranges a little above a year. Contrary to the output,
inflation dynamics in the majority of the countries recovers earlier compared to the aggregate.
The outputs of Belgium, France, Ireland, and Portugal are less sensitive to the interest
rate fluctuations than the aggregate. The response for Portugal is very flat, reaching a 0.2
percentage point contraction at the maximum. The remaining countries in the group contract
within the neighborhood of 0.6 percentage points. For these countries, with the exception of
Belgium, the trough of monetary induced recession lags that of the aggregate. The impulse
response for Luxembourg is closely aligned with that of the Euro Area. The Austrian business
cycle, though similar to the aggregate in magnitude and general path, appears to lag the
aggregate at any given period.
In the face of a contractionary monetary shock, the outputs for Germany, Spain, Finland,
Italy, and the Netherlands contract more than the aggregate Euro Area output does. The level
of maximum contraction for this group varies between 1 to 1.8 percentage points. The responses
for Spain and Italy overshoot that of the aggregate earlier, and the countries show a greater
level of recovery at period 40. For the countries in this group, the timing of the maximum
contraction is very close to the timing of the trough of the aggregate recession. Only Germany
and the Netherlands start the recovery a couple of months before the aggregate.
With respect to cross-country differences in the behavior of inflation, the countries can be
put into two distinct groups. In the first group of countries, inflation is the same or above
the aggregate for all periods considered, while in the second group the relative rankings of
country-specific and aggregate inflation rates change.13 Austria, Spain, France, Ireland, and
Portugal are members of the first group. The maximum level of inflation for the countries in
this group reaches 0.0275 percentage points, and the turning points lag the aggregate recovery
13In the analysis above, inflation and deflation rates are used interchangeably, which is justified under the
assumption of the symmetry of the business cycles. If the rate of the price change is decreasing upon a
contractionary monetary shock, it is thought to increase under an expansionary one.
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for about a year.
The second group includes Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands. For this group of countries, there is a reversal in the relative ranking of country-specific
and aggregate inflation rates. Usually country-specific inflation is greater than the aggregate
for about 12 to 19 months, thus showing mild evidence of a price puzzle. After that, the ag-
gregate level of price change subsides, while the country-specific inflation continues increasing.
The exception in the group is Luxembourg, which recovered much faster. In fact, Luxembourg
is the only country where the inflation rate was below the aggregate at 40 months into a
recession.
In order to reflect on uncertainty, I plot the density functions for country-specific output
and inflation impulse responses. To conserve space, I concentrate on the 24-period ahead
impulse response because it more or less corresponds to the timing of the maximum response
for the variables of interest. The empirical distribution of country-specific impulse responses
are contrasted with that of the aggregate. As Figure C.6 shows, there is far greater uncertainty
around the country-specific output responses relative to the aggregate. Moreover, the mode
value of the impulse response for countries such as the Netherlands and Portugal correspond
to an aggregate value with a very low probability. The distributions of the output responses
for Ireland and Luxembourg are very wide. The values of mode responses of Germany, Spain,
and Finland are below the mode of the Euro Area. The values of mode responses of Belgium
and France are above the mode of the Euro Area. The country with its mode closest to the
aggregate is Italy. The case for inflation is different. As Figure C.7 shows, all countries except
Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg have distributions fairly well aligned with the aggregate.
To summarize, the impulse response functions show that the discretionary component of
the monetary policy creates far greater differentials in the magnitudes of cross-country output
responses compared to inflation responses. The differentials are also fairly persistent. For 82
percent of the countries, there is no reversal in the ranking of the output response relative to
the aggregate in 40 months into a recession. The impulse response function distributions show
that in certain cases the difference is also significant. The differentials in inflation responses are
small and insignificant. However, the persistence in the relative rankings still exhibits itself.
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Once a country is above the aggregate with its output response, the tendency continues for a
relatively long time.
Researchers use forecast error variance decomposition to get to the driving forces of the
business cycle. Throughout our empirical investigation, the shocks that I are able to identify
are the local demand, cost push, and common monetary policy shocks. The contribution of each
of these shocks to the total variability of country-specific output and inflation are provided in
Table B.3. The variance decomposition exercise shows that monetary policy disturbances have
a more predominant role in explaining the business cycle fluctuations in some countries more
than in others. In addition, the driving sources of the output fluctuations across the countries
are different depending on the countries and the forecast horizon. On the other hand, the
inflation variations across the countries and over various horizons are mainly explained by cost
push shocks.
The table shows that a greater proportion of the output variation across the countries is
driven by the demand side (country-specific aggregate demand and common monetary) distur-
bances. This is particularly true for countries such as Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands,
and Portugal, where the demand-side explains a larger share of the output variation at least
from period 12 and further. The common monetary policy interventions explain a large share
of the output variations for Austria, Spain, and Italy for all periods considered. For Germany,
the share of the output variation explained by a monetary policy shock increases over time
reaching about 70 percent upon a 24 month period. This is in contrast to countries such as
Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, and Portugal where the contribution of monetary policy shocks
to the output fluctuation remains small (less than 10%) across all horizons. Nevertheless, the
cost-push shocks are also relevant for some countries. They are important for Germany, France,
Italy, and Luxembourg at least at a horizon of one year.
In contrast, the sources of inflation variations are more homogenous across the countries.
Cost-push shocks explain about 90 percent of the variation across various horizons. The share
of monetary shocks in the total variation, on the other hand, is very low. Upon impact, that
is by period 3, the range for output variation explained by monetary policy shocks is about
0.46 percentage points, by period 12 it becomes 1.26 percentage points, and by period 24 it is
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at a level of 4.29 percentage points.
Next, I look at the systematic part of the union-wide monetary policy rule. In order to
access how well an aggregate targeting monetary policy manages to stabilize the individual
economies, I rely on the monetary literature that evaluates the welfare losses associated with
various simple but yet “suboptimal” policy rules. Gal´ı (2003), discusses the literature in a
closed economy context, while Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) conduct such an exercise in an open
economy setting. In essence, the evaluation of the various simple policy rules lands itself into
simulating the system under various parameterizations for the shock processes and policy rules
and then evaluating the welfare loss of the economy compared to a prespecified benchmark.
In our analysis, I think of the steady state of the economies, which are symmetric for the
countries in the union as the benchmark. I then simulate the VAR system by drawing from the
historical distributions of the country-specific demand and cost-push shocks. I then look at
the variability of output and inflation across the countries because their weighted combination
in general is associated with a welfare loss function.14 The simulation results for a time period
spanning 20 years are provided in Table B.4. The table lists the contributions of inflation and
output variability to country-specific welfare losses. The total welfare loss is calculated by
adding the output and inflation variability.15
The table shows that the contribution of inflation variability to welfare loss is small across
the countries. The country with the highest simulated variation is Austria, while for Germany
and France the inflation variation is zero. A considerable part of the variation in the total
welfare loss comes from the variability of the output. Belgium follows France with the lowest
simulated output variability, while Austria and Ireland record the highest. It appears that
the aggregate targeting monetary policy is too “tight” for Austria and Ireland in that the
stabilization policy around a symmetric steady state is accomplished with the highest welfare
loss equivalent to 3.1137 and 1.1385 points variation. On the other hand, the simulated results
show that the systematic component of monetary policy accomplishes the stabilization goal for
14See Gal´ı (2008) for details.
15The simulation for periods shorter and longer provide qualitatively similar, but quantitatively different
results.
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countries such Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and Portugal successfully. Thus, the systematic
part of the monetary policy also generates heterogeneity across the union members. Although,
it appears that the stabilization of inflation is conducted rather successfully, sometimes it
comes at a cost of output variation.
Overall, monetary policy affects some countries more than others. When a contractionary
monetary policy hits the economy, it generates differences in magnitude and duration of a
recession across the countries. Monetary policy innovations appear to explain small portion of
the inflation fluctuations across the countries over business cycle horizons, while they account
for a fairly large portion of business cycle fluctuations for the output. The range of output
variations attributed to the policy shocks varies across countries. In the face of idiosyncratic
country-specific shocks, the systematic component of the monetary policy achieves stabilization
for certain countries more successfully than for others. Overall, output variability dominates
inflation variability. For some union members, the recession is more severe because monetary
policy shocks are a vital part of the business cycle fluctuations. The systematic component
is also more successful in obviating the inflation variability across the countries, at times at a
cost of output variation. Thus, in general, the inflation and output dynamics highlighted in
section 2.2 can be reconciled with the existence of a common monetary policy.
2.8 Robustness to the Prior
It is well known that prior matters in a small sample inference. The results presented above
rely on a symmetric hierarchical prior, which imposes a similar structure on the economies at
the start. This assumption is not a stretch since the countries need to meet a convergence
criteria in order to qualify for entry into a monetary union. However, the concern is that some
countries have undergone more changes in order to meet the convergence criteria compared
to others. So, one might think that there is some inertia in the reforms that reveals itself
even after entry into the union. Alternatively, it is also possible that the observed differences
are mere continuations of the differences that occurred prior to the adoption of the euro and
are not artifacts of a common monetary policy per se. In order to shed light on this issue, I
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conduct a robustness exercise for the prior.
I estimate a similar empirical specification using pre-euro data for a number of countries
under a flat prior, and then I use the posterior distribution as a prior distribution for the
post-euro inference. More specifically, I adhere to the estimation of the system provided in
(2.59) with no identification restrictions. In addition, I impose no prior beliefs so that the
estimation results are based solely on the likelihood function. In essence, I are conducting an
empirical Bayesian exercise where the prior does not come from theoretical “beliefs” about the
world. Rather, it summarizes the pattern of the data observable in the Euro Area member
countries before the euro was put into circulation. I treat the posterior distributions of the VAR
parameters as approximately normal and use sufficient statistics to parameterize multinomial
normal priors for the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients.
Admittedly, there is a need to make a choice about the variables to be used since the
definitions of the data series for a number of countries has changed after entering the Euro
Area. The search of comparable data series pre-1999 narrows the set of countries down to
five, namely Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, and Italy. Our sample of pre-Euro data is in a
monthly frequency and starts in 1992 to accommodate for the potential changes introduced by
the German unification. The data series are the same as listed below, with a few exceptions.
I use a measure of a harmonized index of consumer prices excluding energy prices provided
by the ECB.16 Since historical measures of M2 are readily available for the member countries
in Eurostat, I use them directly in our estimation. The target interest rate of the German
central bank is used as a pre-Euro policy measure. The pre-1999 values of the union-wide
prices, industrial production, and money supply (M2) are backcasted by the Eurostat, and I
use them as such.
The results of the robustness exercise in terms of the effects of the discretionary monetary
interventions are provided in Figures C.8 and C.9. In comparison, Figure C.8 is qualitatively
similar to Figures C.4. The Euro Area output response is about the same with a mild change
in the timing of the trough. The recovery starts about three months earlier. The responses
16The similar series in Eurostat goes back only to 1996.
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of the country-specific outputs are less in magnitude when compared to the results under the
hierarchical prior. For example, in the case of Belgium, the contraction is 0.1 percentage points
less, while in the case of Italy it is about 0.3 percentage points less. In addition, the recovery
at a country level also starts earlier compared to the previous discussion. Nevertheless, the
relative rankings for the considered countries in terms of the output response and the timing of
recovery do not change. The notable exception is Italy, for which the two parameterizations of
the prior yield different results. When the prior is parameterized consistent with the empirical
regularities of the pre-Euro area, Italy experiences a less severe monetary induced recession
compared to the Euro Area.
The juxtaposition of Figures C.9 and C.5 show that the changes in the prior mainly result
in a magnitude difference for the inflation response across the countries and the union. For all
the countries besides Italy, the inflation response is at most about 0.05 percentage points less
than that under the hierarchical prior. This pattern is true for the aggregate response as well.
For Italy, inflation contracts twice as much compared to the rest of the considered countries
upon a contractionary monetary policy shock. In the case of inflation, the relative rankings of
the countries are robust to the change in the prior. In addition, the prior plays no role in the
mitigation of the price puzzle.
Thus, I conclude that our results are overall robust to changes in the prior. If anything, the
alternative specification of the prior decreases the differences across the Euro Area countries
in output, having no effect on the differences in inflation.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper studies the degree to which the business cycle heterogeneity in a currency union
can be explained by a common monetary policy. Though the main implications of the paper
come from the empirical application, it adds to the literature by postulating an empirical
specification consistent with a well-defined theory. The estimation results for the Euro Area
show that monetary policy is relatively successful in stabilizing the country-specific measures of
consumer price inflation at a symmetric level. However, both the systematic and discretionary
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components of monetary policy have the potency of creating asymmetric output responses.
Which particular transmission channel or structural asymmetry is responsible for the observed
variability in the adjustment mechanism of the output remains to be tested more directly. The
theoretical model postulated in this paper assumes a symmetric benchmark; thus, it can not
address the more explicit reasons for heterogeneity. These questions remain to be addressed
with future research.
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Chapter 3
Taylor Rule and the Stance of the
Monetary Policy
3.1 Introduction
The primary objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) is price stability. Based on its
mandate the central bank can pursue the objectives of the European Union (EU) stated as
“economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced and
sustainable development.” Nevertheless, if a conflicting situation is to arise, ECB is committed
to give priority to price stability.1
Price stability is measured in terms of “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro Area below 2%.” It is worth noting that the 2% inflation
target is a medium-term target and as such it implies a forward looking policymaking. In
addition, the HICP for the Euro Area is calculated as a weighted average of the country-specific
HICP-s proportional to their economic size. More specifically, the weights are calculated as
shares of country-specific household consumption expenditures in the total for the Euro Area
(EA) and are updated annually.
The goal of price stability is achieved based on “two-pilar” strategy, which states that the
ECB uses the monitoring of economic data, as well as monetary aggregates simultaneously
1Detailed discussion of the European Central Bank, its mandate and policy objectives is provided in The
European Central Bank (2009).
as a cross-check for policymaking. In a way, given the setting one could think about the
ECB maintaining a longer-term money supply growth target as it responds to the economic
fundamentals.
The theoretical literature, on the contrary, suggests a different weighting for the aggregate
inflation than it is practically implemented in the EA. Benigno (2004) considers a currency
area model where the member economies exhibit various degrees of price rigidities. Given
the environment, the optimal monetary policy should weight the country-specific inflations
proportional to the degree of nominal rigidity observed in each individual economy. In this
specific setup, weighting according to the economic size is optimal only when the degree of
nominal rigidities are equal. In a similar exercise, when fiscal policy is introduced to the mix,
Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) show that it is optimal for the monetary authority to stabilize the
aggregate inflation, and for the fiscal authority to stabilize the asymmetries associated with
the heterogeneity observed in the nominal rigidities across the countries.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a simple monetary policy rule for the EA in an
effort to conjecture about the weighting matrix associated with the country-specific variables
in the monetary policy rule ex-post. The rules considered are from a family of Taylor rules
in accord to Taylor (1993). The objectives of the paper are two. First, it gives new evidence
about the stance of the monetary policy in the EA relying on the post-Euro data. As such,
it contributes to the vast literature on the evaluation of monetary policy rules in practice
as in Clarida et al. (1998) and Orphanides (2002). Second, by contrasting a disaggregated
monetary policy rule to an aggregate one, I can conjecture about the implicit weights used in
the policymaking and contrast it with the findings of the theoretical literature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Taylor rule
models considered. Section 3.3 introduces the methodology used. Section 3.4 discusses the
data and 3.5 considers the results. Section 3.6 demonstrates a robustness study, while section
3.7 concludes.
40
3.2 Taylor Rule Specifications
As suggested previously, I consider two types of Taylor rule. The first one is stated as a
monetary reaction function that stabilizes the aggregate economy, where the economic fun-
damentals monetary policy reacts to are weighted averages of country-specific fundamentals.
Second, I consider a disaggregated monetary reaction function, where I postulate a monetary
policy rule that explicitly targets the country-specific deviations in addition to the aggregates,
thus uncovering the weighting implicitly used in policymaking.
3.2.1 Aggregate Taylor Rules
I follow Clarida et al. (1998) in postulating the aggregate monetary reaction function in the
following form
r∗t = r¯ + β(E[pit+n|Ωt]− pi∗) + γ(E[yt|Ωt]− y∗t ), (3.1)
where r∗t , pi∗, and y∗t are the nominal interest rate, inflation, and output gap targets. r¯ indicates
the long-run equilibrium interest rate, which I elaborate on further, while the central bank
reacts to its expectations about n-period ahead inflation and contemporaneous output gap
formed based on the information available at time t, Ωt. In general, to guarantee unique
equilibrium one needs to impose the assumption that β > 1 and γ > 0.2
The Taylor rule of (3.1) is a more general version of the one originally proposed by Taylor
(1993). In the original specification of the Taylor rule, the policy authority sets the interest
rates in response to the lagged and contemporaneous values of inflation and output respectively
as opposed to their expectations. More specifically, it reacts to one percentage point increase
in inflation deviations from its target by increasing the nominal interest rate by 1.5 percentage
points, while increasing the nominal interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to one percentage
point increase in the output deviation. The specification considered in this paper nests the
original Taylor rule with unrestricted parameters.
2This restriction ensures that the central bank conducts monetary policy based on Taylor Principle, which
eliminates the sunspot equilibria in which self-fulfilling expectations drive the explosive dynamics of inflation
and output. The relevance of the sunspot equilibria in historic analysis of the monetary policy for the U.S. is
provided in Clarida et al. (2000).
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In general Taylor rules are important under the assumption that money has real effects,
which is in essence possible if the economy can be characterized by nominal rigidities either in
product or labor markets or in both. In this case, it is optimal for the monetary policy to make
the rigidities non-binding by its interest rate instrument. Suppose, the nominal rigidities are
in the product market. By setting the interest rates around a zero inflation target the central
bank would make the nominal rigidities irrelevant: when there is no inflation it would not
matter for the overall dynamics of the economy that prices are slow to adjust. Consequently,
it is optimal for the policy authority to stabilize the economy at the flexible price equilibrium
output level and not at any other level. I will denote that point by y∗t . The interest rate that
would prevail at the bliss point for inflation, pi∗t = 0, and output, y∗t , would be referred to as
long-run interest rate or natural interest rate and is denoted by r¯.
It is observed that the central banks move the interest rates in a smooth fashion. Some
reasons indicated in the literature as an explanation for this behavior are the unwillingness of
the policy authority to disrupt the capital markets or lose credibility from the policy jumps
as discussed in Clarida et al. (1998). To account for this dynamics, I follow the literature in
assuming that the actual nominal interest rate adjusts to the target in the following way
rt = (1− ρ)r∗t + ρrt−1 + νt, (3.2)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and νt are i.i.d. policy shocks.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) give us the first interest rate rule that I consider in the empirical
application. Let xt = yt−y∗t and α = r¯−βpi∗t . I will refer to xt as output gap in the remainder
of the paper. By substitution and reparameterization I obtain
rt = (1− ρ)(r¯ + β(E[pit+n|Ωt]− pi∗) + γ(E[yt|Ωt]− y∗t )) + ρrt−1 + νt,
= (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)βpit+n + (1− ρ)γxt + t, (3.3)
where t is a linear combination of inflation and output gap forecast errors and structural
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disturbances νt.
t = −(1− ρ)(β(pit+n − E[pit+n|Ωt]) + γ(xt − E[xt|Ωt])) + νt
To accommodate for the “two-pilar” approach to monetary policy in addition to the bench-
mark Taylor rule specified in (3.3), I consider a policy rule, which targets money supply growth
as well. The rule is specified as follows
r∗t = r¯ + β(E[pit+n|Ωt]− pi∗) + γ(E[yt|Ωt]− y∗t ) + κ(E[mt+n|Ωt]−m∗t+n), (3.4)
where m is the money supply growth rate and m∗ is its target level.
Let qt+n = mt+n −m∗t+n. For consistency, I can rewrite equation (3.4) similar to (3.3) as
rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)βpit+n + (1− ρ)γxt + (1− ρ)φqt+n + ut, (3.5)
where ut includes νt and a weighted forecast error associated with the money growth as well.
3.2.2 Disaggregated Taylor Rules
For disaggregated monetary policy rules I consider the benchmark (equation 3.3) and alter-
native (equation 3.5) policy rules augmented with country-specific inflation, output gap, and
money growth deviations from the aggregate. In particular, I estimate the following two rules
for l member countries in the currency union.
1. Benchmark Taylor Rule
rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(βpit+n +
l∑
i=1
βi(pi
i
t+n − pit+n)) (3.6)
+ (1− ρ)(γxt +
l∑
i=1
γi(x
i
t − xt)) + t
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2. Alternative Taylor Rule
rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(βpit+n +
l∑
i=1
βi(pi
i
t+n − pit+n)) (3.7)
+ (1− ρ)(γxt +
l∑
i=1
γi(x
i
t − xt))
+ (1− ρ)(φqt+n +
l∑
i=1
φi(q
i
t+n − qt+n)) + ut
In essence, the disaggregated Taylor rules in equations (3.6) and (3.7) nest the aggregate
Taylor rules in equations (3.3) and (3.5). The maintained null hypothesis is that the country-
specific deviations from the aggregate are irrelevant for the policy rule, i.e. βi = 0, for i =
1, ..., l. Under the null hypothesis, the aggregate and disaggregate models are the same.3
3.3 Estimation Methodology
I estimate the Taylor rules specified in (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) by instrumental variable ap-
proach. Let Xt be a set of variables in the information set of the policy authority at time
t (i.e. Xt ∈ Ωt), such that E(t|Xt) = 0 and E(ut|Xt) = 0. In our case this would include
lagged values of inflation, output gap, and growth rate for money supply depending on the
Taylor rule specification. In the classical world one would proxy the behavior of the n-step
ahead inflation and money growth as well as contemporaneous values of the output gap in the
Taylor rule equations with the mentioned instruments to yield unbiased and consistent param-
eter estimates. Researchers commonly use methods such as two stage least squares, limited
information maximum likelihood or generalized method of moments estimation techniques to
implement the instrumental variable (IV) estimations and achieve statistical identification.
The Bayesian counterpart that I use for estimating a single equation Taylor rule is similar
in spirit to that of two stage least squares in the classical framework. It relies on postulating
3 Given that l is less than the number of total countries in the Euro Area, I exclude the scenario where the
models become identical because the weights put on country-specific deviations in the policy rule are equal to
the weights used to construct the corresponding aggregate variables.
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a limited information simultaneous equations model, where the dynamics of the endogenous
variables are expressed in terms of the instruments. Under particular assumptions which I
elaborate on further, one can simulate from exactly specified conditional posterior distributions
to identify the structural parameters.
Following Kleibergen and Zivot (2003) I specify a limited information simultaneous equa-
tion model in the following structural form
Y1 = Y2β + 1
Y2 = XΠ + V2, (3.8)
where the first equation is the structural equation of ultimate interest and the second presents
the dynamics of the endogenous variables in terms of the instruments and other exogenous
variables. Accordingly, Y1 is a T × 1 vector of endogenous variables, Y2 is a T × (m − 1)
matrix of endogenous variables, while X is a T × k matrix of instruments, i.e. exogenous
variables excluded from the single equation regression model. 1 is a T × 1 vector of structural
errors, while V2 is a T × (m− 1) vector of reduced form errors. X is assumed to be full rank,
deterministic, uncorrelated with the error terms, and weakly exogenous for the structural
parameter β. Let Σ be the covariance matrix of the error terms, Σ = Cov(1, V2).
I can rewrite the system in (3.8) in the following restricted reduced form
Y1 = XΠβ + ν1
Y2 = XΠ + V2, (3.9)
where ν1 = 1 + V2β and
Ω = Cov(ν1, V2) =
 Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
 =
 1 0
β Im−1

′
Σ
 1 0
β Im−1
 (3.10)
All endogenous variables can be presented in terms of the exogenous variables in a reduced
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form
Y1 = Xpi + ν1
Y2 = XΠ + V2, (3.11)
I estimate the reduced form specified in (3.11). Identification of structural parameters in
β is achieved if and only if rank(Π) = m − 1. In addition, when k = m − 1, the system is
uniquely identified, and, when k > m− 1, the system is overidentified to k −m+ 1 degree. 4
In order to outline the estimation methodology, I rewrite the error term ν1 and accordingly
the system in (3.9) in a slightly reparameterized form
Y1 = XΠβ + e1 + V2φ
Y2 = XΠ + V2, (3.12)
where e1 = ν1 − V2φ and φ = Ω−122 Ω21. Accordingly, V ar(e1) = ω11 = Ω11 − Ω12Ω−122 Ω21, and
e1 and V2 are uncorrelated.
Let Y = (Y1 Y2) and θ be the vector of parameters that are of interest, i.e. θ =
(β, φ,Π, ω11,Ω22). The likelihood function of the model in (3.12) is given by
p(Y |X, θ) = p(Y1|Y2, X, θ)p(Y2|X, θ), (3.13)
where
p(Y1|Y2, X, θ) ∝ ω−0.5T11 exp[−0.5ω−111 (Y1 −XΠβ − V2φ)′(Y1 −XΠβ − V2φ)] (3.14)
p(Y2|X, θ) ∝ |Ω22|−0.5T exp[−0.5tr(Ω−122 (Y2 −XΠ)′(Y2 −XΠ))]. (3.15)
Following Kleibergen and Zivot (2003) I consider a diffuse prior that puts equal probability
4The intuition behind the identification restrictions is that you would like the instrumental variables to be
able to span the endogenous variable space uniquely.
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on the parameter space in the following form
p(θ|X) ∝ ω−m11 |Ω|−0.5(m+k−1)|Π′X ′XΠ|0.5. (3.16)
This proposition of the prior is motivated by the idea that the set of structural parameters
β is not identified if Π has reduced rank, thus the model as such is not informative about β
in this case. As discussed in Kleibergen and Zivot (2003), the prior marginally improves the
estimation results in the case of weak instruments and behaves similar to the Two-stage least
squares (2SLS) in the classical world.
The posterior probability can be expressed as
p(θ|Y,X) ∝ p(Y |X, θ)p(θ|X) (3.17)
Let PA be the orthogonal projection onto the column space of some nonsingular matrix A,
i.e. PA = A(A
′A)−1A′, and MA = I − PA.
Given (3.17), it can be shown that the conditional and marginal probability distributions
for the structural parameters are as follows
P (β|φ,Π, ω11,Ω22, Y,X) ∝ ω−0.5(m−1)11 |Π′X ′XΠ|0.5
×exp[−0.5ω−111 (β − βˆ)′Π′X ′XΠ(β − βˆ)] (3.18)
P (φ|Π, ω11,Ω22, Y,X) ∝ ω−0.5(m−1)11 |V ′2MXΠV2|0.5
×exp[−0.5ω−111 (φ− φˆ)′V ′2MΠXV2(φ− φˆ)] (3.19)
P (ω11|Π,Ω22, Y,X) ∝ ω−0.5(T+2)11 |y′1M(XΠ V2)y1|0.5T
×exp[−0.5ω−111 y′1M(XΠ V2)y1] (3.20)
P (Ω22|Π,Ω22, Y,X) ∝ |Ω22|−0.5(T+k+m−1)|V ′2V2|0.5(T+k−1)
×exp[−0.5tr(Ω−122 V ′2V2)] (3.21)
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P (Π|Y,X) ∝
[ |Π′X ′XΠ|
|Π′X ′MY2XΠ|
]0.5 [ |Π′X ′MY2XΠ|
|Π′X ′MYXΠ|
]0.5T
×|(Π− Πˆ)′X ′X(Π− Πˆ) + Y ′2MXY2|−0.5(T+k−1) (3.22)
where βˆ = (Π′X ′XΠ)−1Π′X ′(Y1−V2φ), φˆ = (V ′2MXΠV2)−1V ′2MXΠY1 and Πˆ = (X ′X)−1(X ′Y2).
The distributions in (3.18)-(3.21) are standard. The conditional distributions of β and φ
expressed in equations (3.18) and (3.19) are multivariate normal. The conditional distribution
for ω11 (equation 3.20) is Inverse Gamma, while the distribution for Ω22 is Inverse Wishart
expressed by the density kernel in (3.21). The marginal density function for Π is non-standard
and will be simulated based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods via a random-
walk Metropolis algorithm.
The essence of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is to construct a Markov Chain such that
its stationary distribution is P (Π|Y,X) provided in equation (3.22). For expositional purposes
let P (Π|Y,X) = pi(Π). First I suggest a proposal density q(.|Π) which guides the sampling
of the next state of Πt+1 given the current state of Πt. More specifically, I draw a candidate
point O from a proposal distribution q(.|Π) and accept it as the next state, Πt+1 = O, with
an acceptance probability of
α(Πt, O) = min
(
1,
pi(O)q(Πt|O)
pi(Πt)q(O|Πt)
)
(3.23)
As discussed in Gilks et al. (1996), given the algorithm, the stationary distribution will
be P (Π|Y,X) despite the form of the proposal density q(.|Π). In particular, the random walk
Metropolis algorithm considers the proposal densities that are symmetric such that q(O|Πt) =
q(Πt|O) = q(|Πt − O|). In our particular case, I consider a multivariate normal proposal
distribution with a mean Πˆ and constant covariance matrix (X ′X)−1σ2/l0.1, where l is the
lag of the variable used as an instrument and σ is parameterized such that it generates an
acceptance probability between 60%−70%. In essence, the prior imposes a smaller uncertainty
on the lagged values of the instrumental variables compared to the current values. Under the
random walk Metropolis algorithm the acceptance probability reduces to
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α(Πt, O) = min
(
1,
pi(O)
pi(Πt)
)
(3.24)
I make a Metropolis draw from (3.22), then simulate from the conditional distributions with
a Gibbs sampler. I burn-in 20,000 initial simulation values and use the next 80,000 simulated
values to calculate the moments of the distributions in concern. I check the convergence of
the Metropolis algorithm by Geweke statistics (Geweke (1992)), which tests for the equality
of the posterior means of the parameters for different halves of the simulated chain under the
maintained hypothesis of equality of the estimated standard deviations over the same halves.
If the chain has converged such that the simulated draws come from the same stationary
distribution as in (3.22), the Geweke statistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution.
The same applies to the chains that result from a Gibbs sampler. In addition, I truncate the
distribution for (3.18) such that the draws for the autoregressive coefficient on the interest
rates are below unity.
3.4 Data
Since the policymakers at the ECB target year-to-year inflation rate, I set n = 12 to ac-
commodate for one-year ahead inflation forecast given monthly data. The set of instruments
considered for the estimation are similar to that in Clarida et al. (1998). For the benchmark
rules specified in (3.3) and (3.6) I consider lagged values of output, inflation, interest rates, and
commodity prices as a set of instruments. For the alternative rules specified in (3.6) and (3.7)
I also consider the lagged values of money supply. In general, when estimating the aggregate
Taylor rules, I use 8 lags for each variable as an instrument together with a constant. For all
variables other than the interest rates I use lags 1 to 6, as well as 9 and 12 to compile the
set of instruments. For the interest rates I use values for lags 2 to 7, together with 9 and
12 as instruments. For the disaggregated Taylor rule in the benchmark specification I use 5
consecutive lags for each variable as an instrument, while for the alternative specification I use
3 lags only. The construction of the lags for the interest rates and the rest of the variables is
similar to the construction of the instrument set for the aggregate Taylor rule estimation.
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In the disaggregated specification I consider the six largest economies of the Euro zone, i.e.
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The six countries combined have
about 90% of the EA output and population. The data I use is in monthly frequencies and spans
the period 1999:1-2008:12. I use the first difference of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) in logs as a measure of union-specific and country-specific inflation rates. I consider
the Industrial Production Index (IPI) for the union-specific and country-specific output levels.
In order to get a measure for the output gap I detrend the natural logarithm of the IPI
using a deterministic trend in a quadratic form. I proxy the money supply data by the
value of total deposit liabilities of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) due to unavailability
of the comparable readily available data across the EA countries for the period I consider.
Commodity price index is taken from the Global Financial Data database and reflects the
average valuation of the commodity dollar index in euros. All variables, except the commodity
price index, are taken from the Eurostat. The data for HICP and total deposit liabilities have
been seasonally adjusted by X-11 filtering.
3.5 Empirical Results
Table B.5 reports the estimation results for the benchmark specification as in equation (3.3).5
As shown in the table, there is a high weight on the interest rate smoothing for the policy
reaction function for the ECB. The median value for the autoregressive term is 0.90, with
the 95% coverage area containing values from 0.83 to 0.97. The weight on the output gap is
statistically not different from zero. In addition, it appears that the ECB is conducting a very
inflation “hawkish” policy, by increasing the interest rate with 3.01 percentage points for every
percentage point increase in the anticipated inflation. The 95% coverage area for the reaction
function coefficients for the inflation includes values above 1 which is in accord to the Taylor
Principle discussed previously.
Once I allow the central bank to target money growth in addition to inflation and output
5The constant term in this table and hereafter is reported given the mean of the interest rate. The distribution
for the constant is attained from the distribution of the autoregressive component. The data that goes through
the estimation algorithm is demeaned.
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gap, the latter two lose their significance as suggested by Table B.6. The coefficient on the
interest rate smoothing does not change for the alternative specification compared to the
benchmark. Since the distribution of α comes from the distribution of the autoregressive
coefficient, it does not change as well. It appears that when accounting for one-year ahead
money growth in the Taylor rule, the inflation targeting becomes statistically insignificant. As
the one-period ahead money growth increases by one percentage point, the median increase in
the policy interest rate is 2.27 percentage points.
The results for benchmark specification of the Taylor rule that incorporates country-specific
output gap and inflation differentials are depicted in B.7. The coefficient on the aggregate
output gap and country specific output gap differentials from the aggregate are not significantly
different from zero. Thus, the conclusion that ECB does not respond to the output gap with
its policy interest rule continues to hold. The case for inflation is somewhat different. Though
ECB reacts to the aggregate inflation in accord to the Taylor rule, it appears that the response
to the country-specific inflation deviations from the aggregate are significantly different from
zero as well where Italy is the exception. It is interesting to observe that the inflation deviations
in Spain and France affect the policy interest rate negatively, while the deviations in Belgium,
Germany, and the Netherlands affect the policy response in a direction consistent with the
aggregate.
The results for the alternative specification of the Taylor rule are presented in B.8. The
dynamics is similar to that in the aggregate Taylor rule specification: once money aggregates
are introduced the response of the interest rates to anticipated country-specific inflation differ-
entials becomes largely insignificant. The notable exceptions are Belgium and the Netherlands
for which increases in the inflation deviations are accompanied with more than one-to-one
increase in the policy interest rate. This is the case even when the response to the aggregate
inflation becomes statistically insignificant. Aggregate monetary targeting still appears to be
significant, while in general the country-specific deviations from the aggregate do not appear
to matter for almost all the countries except Belgium and Germany. The money growth de-
viations for Germany drive the interest rates higher, while the Belgian deviations have the
opposite effect.
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3.6 Robustness
As a robustness study, I estimate the Taylor rules treating the time t expectations of inflation
and output growth for the next year as exogenous. More specifically, I use the Survey of
Professional Forecasters provided by the ECB to get quarterly measure of one-year ahead
output growth and inflation expectations for the aggregate economy. Since these forecasts are
formed in period t with the information available through period t − 1, there is no issue of
erogeneity and no need to use instrumental variables techniques. I use the data that spans
1999:Q1-2010:Q2. First I consider the data comparable to the period considered in the earlier
sections, then I expand the data set to capture the whole sample.
I assume a standard, conjugate Normal-Gamma prior for the regression parameters centered
around the values ρ = 0.9, β = 1.5, and γ = 0.5. The explicit values are taken from the original
suggestions of Taylor (1993) and the baseline estimations of the Budnesbank reaction function
as in Clarida et al. (1998). Let δ be a vector of reduced from regression parameters that has
a normal prior which assumes
δ|h ∝ N(δ, h−1V ). (3.25)
where δ takes the reduced form values corresponding to the values of the structural parameters
mentioned earlier. I consider V to have fairly large diagonal values such that the prior is non-
informative. I impose a prior in a form of a Gamma distribution for h and parameterize it to
be non-informative as well.6
As shown in Koop (2004) (chapter 3), given the Normal-Gamma conjugate prior, the
posterior distribution for the parameter vector of the multivariate linear regression model can
be written as
δ|y ∝ t(δ, s2V , ν), (3.26)
6I do this by setting the scale parameter to zero.
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where
V = (V −1 +X ′X)−1 (3.27)
δ = V (V −1δ +X ′Xδˆ) (3.28)
ν = ν +N (3.29)
νs2 = νs2 + νs2 + (δˆ − δ)′[V + (X ′X)−1]−1(δˆ − δ) (3.30)
and ν, s2, and δˆ are the OLS quantities.
I report the results from 30,000 Monte Carlo simulations in Table B.9. The simulated
chains have converged based on the Geweke statistics discussed previously at 5% significance
level. As shown in the table, when using exogenously given expectations data, the weight
on the interest rate smoothing goes down such that the upper bound for the 95% confidence
interval does not reach 0.90. Despite the sample period considered, the data reveals more
weight on the inflation than output growth in the policy reaction function. In addition, the
weight on one-year ahead output growth expectations appears to be more precisely estimated
such that the 95% confidence interval is narrower compared to that one-year ahead inflation
expectations. It appears that the reaction to both inflation and output growth expectations
has subdued when I extend the data sample as shown in part (B) of table B.9. However, when
I compare the robustness results with the benchmark results presented earlier, I can see that
the weight on inflation expectations is not significantly different for the two cases, though the
95% coverage area for the IV case is wider and slightly skewed towards the upper tail. On the
contrary, when considering the monetary policy reaction to the one-year ahead output growth,
I do get significant response from the policy side. Nevertheless, the response is milder than
that for inflation.
3.7 Conclusion
By its mandate the ECB is committed to the objective of price stability for the Euro Area.
However, the aggregate variables for the Euro Area are constructed in a particular way such
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that the economic variables for each country are weighted proportional to their economic
size. First, this essay estimated the aggregate Taylor rule, thus contributing to the empirical
monetary policy literature using the post-Euro data. I find that the monetary feedback rule is
in accord to the Taylor Principle. When I introduce monetary aggregates to the Taylor rule, it
appears that the path of the interest rate is significantly explained by monetary targeting. In
addition, I estimate a disaggregated Taylor rule where in addition to the aggregate measures
I consider country-specific deviations from the aggregate. It appears that certain country-
specific deviations in inflation and money growth matter for the policymaking.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Member Country Non-Stochastic Steady State
The first-order conditions of the households utility maximization problem, equations (2.8),
(2.9), (2.10), (2.3), together with the market-clearing conditions, equations (2.25), (2.26),
(Dt = 0), yield the following steady state relationships.
βR = 1 (A.1)
CσLϕ =
W
P
(A.2)
Cσ
(
R
R− 1
)
=
(
M
P
)ϕ
(A.3)
WL+ Γ + T = PC (A.4)
D = 0 (A.5)
The firms first-order conditions together with the definition of real marginal cost give
MC =
W
APH
(A.6)
x1 =
Y
1− φβ (A.7)
x2 =
νYMC
1− φβ (A.8)
x1 = x2. (A.9)
The goods market clearing in a steady state becomes
Y = CH +G+X, (A.10)
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and the government budget constraint, equation (2.23), yields T = G.
I assume the steady-state values for the variables following the stochastic processes specified
by equations (2.31, 2.32, 2.33) are A, θ,G. It follows that the steady-state value of markup is
ν = θθ−1 .
Inflation in steady state is zero, that is ΠH = 1. From equation (2.30) the steady state
value of k = 1. The latter, together with (2.29), yields a steady-state value of Y = AL.
The international risk-sharing condition (equation 2.34) implies that in a symmetric steady
state the value for terms of trade is S = 1. The latter, combined with equation (2.35),
determines the steady-state value of Π = ΠH = 1.
In the steady state, the consumption bundle and its allocation between domestic and foreign
goods is determined by
C = Y −G (A.11)
CH = (1− α)C (A.12)
CF = αC. (A.13)
A.2 Member Country Linear Dynamics
In what follows the lower case variables denote the logarithmic deviation of a variable from
a steady state, that is xt = lnXt − lnX, where X is the steady-state value of the variable
Xt. The subscripts for country 1 have been dropped and subscripts for country two have been
changed to asterisks (*) for notational simplicity.
The log-linearization of the economy-wide resource constraint (equation 2.37) yields the
following
yt = (1− gy)(ct + α(xt − cF, t)) + gygt, (A.14)
where gy is the ratio of government expenditures to output in the steady state, that is gy =
G/Y .
Terms of trade are determined by st = pF, t − pH, t, while the log-linearization of equation
(2.38) yields pt = pH, t + αst. Accordingly, the export and import demand functions are (the
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following relies on the union-wide market clearing condition, equation (2.36), and that terms
of trade for the second country is reciprocal to the first, that is s∗t = −st
cF, t = ct − η(1− α)st (A.15)
xt = c
∗
t + η(1− α)st, (A.16)
(A.17)
which yields xt − cF, t = c∗t − ct + 2η(1− α)st = c∗t − ct + κnxst, where κnx = 2η(1− α).
Log-linearizing the international risk-sharing condition, I get
ct = c
∗
t +
1− 2α
σ
st = c
∗
t + κcst, (A.18)
where κc = (1− 2α)/σ.
If I plug in the results into the log-linearized resource constraint, I get
yt = (1− gy)(ct + α(κc + κnx)st) + gygt. (A.19)
The log-linearization of the Euler equation (2.8) gives
ct = ct+1 − 1
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) (A.20)
By combining equations (A.19) and (A.20) I get
yt = Etyt+1 − (1− gy)
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) + gy(gt − Etgt+1) + α(1− gy)κ(st − Etst+1), (A.21)
where κ = kc + knx
When I solve for ct from (A.19) and I plug it into (A.18), I can solve for st in terms of
output and government expenditures
st =
yt − gygt − (y∗t − gyg∗t )
(1− gy)σα (A.22)
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where σα = ((1 + 2α)κc + 2ακnx).
From log-linearization of equations (2.21), (2.22), and x1t = x
2
t yields
piH, t = βpiH, t+1 + λ1mct + λ2θˆt, (A.23)
where λ1 =
(1−φ)(1−φβ)
φ , λ2 =
λ1
(θ−1) , and θˆ is the log deviation of elasticity of demand for the
intermediate good (θt) from its steady state.
From equation (2.30) and utilizing the fact that the first-order approximation to kt around
a zero inflation steady state is zero (Gal´ı (2008)), I get lt = yt− at. The definition of marginal
cost gives, mct = wt − at − pH, t. The two equations together with the labor supply, equation
(2.9), gives mct = σct + αst + ϕyt − (1 + ϕ)at. Plugging in for consumption gives
mct =
σ + ϕ(1− gy)
1− gy yt −
σ
1− gy gygt − α(σκ− 1)st − (1 + ϕ)at. (A.24)
The log-linearization of equation (2.35) yields the following relationship between the domestic
and consumer price inflation
pit = pit, H + α∆st. (A.25)
The log-linearization (up to a constant) of money demand, equation (2.10), with the money
market clearing condition, equation (2.26), implies the following
mt =
σ
ν
ct − ηrt, (A.26)
where mt is the log-deviation of real money demand from its steady state, and η = 1/(ν(R−1)).
Plugging in for ct from (A.19) I get
mt =
σ
ν
(yt − gygt)
(1− gy) −
σψ
ν
st − ηrt, (A.27)
where ψ = α(κc + κnx).
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The stochastic processes in a log-linear form are as follows
at = at−1 + at (A.28)
θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 + θt (A.29)
gt = ρggt−1 + gt. (A.30)
A.3 Union Steady State and Linear Dynamics
From equations (2.37) and (2.38) the steady-state output and inflation in the union will be
Y u = Y (1) = Y (2) and Πu = Π(1) = Π(2) = 1. The policy rule expressed by equation (2.40)
implies a steady-state value of the interest rate R = (Πu)φpi(Y u)φy . The steady-state value of
money supply is Mu = 2M .
The log-linear dynamics of the output, inflation, interest rate, and real money balances in
the union are represented by
yut = wy
(1)
t + (1− w)y(2)t (A.31)
piut = wpi
(1)
t + (1− w)y(2)t (A.32)
rt = φ1pi
u
t + φ2pi
u
t + e
u
rt (A.33)
mut = 0.5m
(1)
t + 0.5m
(2)
t + (w − 0.5)st. (A.34)
A.4 Solution
Let xt = [y
(1)
t pi
(1)
t y
(2)
t pi
(2)
t ]
′ be the vector of endogenous state variables, zt = [m
(1)
t m
(2)
t y
u
t pi
u
t m
u
t rt]
′
be the vector of endogenous variables, and vt = [a
(1)
t θˆ
(1)
t g
(1)
t a
(2)
t θˆ
(2)
t g
(2)
t 
u
rt]
′ be the vector of
exogenous state variables vt. The stochastic disturbances the economy is prone to are collected
in t = [
(1)
at , 
(1)
θt , 
(1)
gt , 
(2)
at , 
(2)
θt , 
(2)
gt , 
u
rt]
′. The equilibrium dynamics of the currency union can
be summarized by a system written consistent with the notation in Uhlig (1999).
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0 = Axt + Czt +Dvt (A.35)
0 = Et[Fxt+1 +Gxt + Jzt+1 +Kzt +Mvt] (A.36)
vt+1 = Nvt + t+1, (A.37)
The mapping of the matrices to the structural parameters are omitted to conserve space
and are available upon request. Since the currency area model highlighted above does not have
any pre-determined state variables, the minimum state variable solution (again, consistent with
the notation in Uhlig (1999)) is in the form of following stochastic difference equations
 xt
zt
 =
 Q
S
 vt, (A.38)
vt = Nvt−1 + t, (A.39)
where Q and S are 4× 7 and 5× 7 matrices respectively with no zero restrictions.1
A.5 Inexact Priors
The existence of a unit root in a VAR setting essentially says that the sum of the coefficients
on the lags of the dependant variable is one, while the coefficients on the lags of other variables
are zero. This prior is imposed by adding n initial observations to the data set, one for each
equation in the VAR. The initial observations are added as follows. For i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., n,
and s = 1, ..., k
1In fact, the solution has been verified for a currency union, where the economies are parameterized in
accord to the values in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), ν = σ, and the aggregate values of inflation and output are
constructed as simple averages of the member economies.
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yij =

µ5y¯0i i = j
0 otherwise
xis =

µ5y¯0i s = i, i+ p, i+ 2p, ..., s < k
0 otherwise
where y¯0i is the average of the first p observations for each series i.
The n additional data observations that are being added can be summarized as follows.
For some artificial time t∗ and series i, I have
yi(t
∗) = yi(t∗ − 1) = ... = yi(t∗ − p) = µ5y¯0i (A.40)
If I rewrite (2.59) in a reduced form, such that G = FA−1, u′t = ′tA−1, and the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form error term ut is Ω = (AA
′)−1. The reduced form
equation will imply that for s = i, i+ p, i+ 2p, ..., s < k
µ5y¯0i = µ5y¯0i
∑
s
Gsi + uit∗ (A.41)
Under the assumption that (1−∑sGsi) 6= 0,
y¯0i = µ
−1
5 (1−
∑
s
Gsi)
−1uit∗ , (A.42)
which implies that y¯0i|G,Ω ∼ N(0, µ−25 (1 −
∑
sGsi)
−1Ω(1 −∑sGsi)′−1). As µ5 → ∞, the
parameter space gets increasingly centered around zero, which implies that the model can be
expressed exclusively in terms of differenced data.
In order to adjust the prior such that it takes care of stable long-run relations between
the series, a new type of initial observation is created. For j = 1, ..., n,, and s = 1, ..., k, this
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observation is constructed in such a way that yj = µ6y¯0j , and
xs =

µ6y¯0j s ≤ k − 1
µ6 s = k.
Analogous to the discussion above, the dummy variable allowing for cointegration can be
written
µ6y¯ =
(
k−1∑
s=1
Gs
)
µ6y¯ + C + ut∗ , (A.43)
where C is an n× 1 vector of constants, C = G′k. In this case when µ6 →∞, the parameter
space gets centered around (1 −
(∑k−1
s=1 Gs
)
)−1C. Now if C 6= 0, these type of initial obser-
vation will impose co-integrating relationship among the variables. C = 0 will imply a single
unit root, which does not exclude cointegration.
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Appendix B
Tables
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Table B.1: Academic Literature on EMU
Source: Jonung and Drea (2010).
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Table B.2: Sims - Zha Reference Prior
Hyperparameter Value Interpretation
λ0 0.6 controls the overall tightness of the beliefs
λ1 0.1 tightens the prior around a random walk
λ3 0.1 directs the rate of contraction when the lag length increases
λ4 1 controls the tightness of the constant
µ5 5 governs the prior on the order of integration
µ6 5 sets the prior belief on the presence of cointegration
σj is proxied by the sample standard deviation of the residuals that
result from a univariate autoregression of order p for series j
Table B.3: Variance Decomposition
Period 3 Period 12 Period 24
Country Dnd Cost Push Mntry Dnd Cost Push Mntry Dnd Cost Push Mntry
Output
Austria 0.10 26.68 22.00 1.00 1.83 42.45 1.80 0.43 45.02
Belgium 69.81 13.43 4.14 82.98 2.36 8.43 84.70 0.80 7.15
Germany 1.54 43.54 7.04 4.50 19.96 47.59 9.74 5.63 69.46
Spain 0.42 5.72 36.37 0.34 4.87 63.31 0.48 1.75 59.22
Finland 19.38 2.26 6.44 41.75 0.71 29.04 51.12 0.22 37.41
France 18.08 50.02 4.53 16.78 20.98 23.36 15.54 7.07 34.55
Ireland 80.78 0.87 1.28 92.57 0.41 2.71 93.62 0.42 3.76
Italy 4.94 19.60 15.38 7.36 25.21 47.05 11.88 13.97 54.67
Luxembourg 12.59 30.31 6.04 26.82 12.91 18.02 37.19 6.03 22.18
Netherlands 82.17 6.71 0.45 87.80 0.73 2.32 86.87 0.20 4.47
Portugal 76.17 12.98 0.03 94.76 2.33 0.35 92.77 1.35 1.52
Price
Austria 1.18 92.17 0.01 1.31 94.49 0.20 1.41 93.42 0.95
Belgium 2.67 86.37 0.00 1.97 91.33 0.08 1.57 92.04 0.24
Germany 0.65 92.90 0.02 0.48 93.40 0.06 0.39 91.95 0.10
Spain 0.17 82.37 0.06 0.05 93.12 0.50 0.03 94.08 1.36
Finland 0.19 92.64 0.04 0.18 94.09 0.08 0.18 92.29 0.67
France 4.29 84.18 0.04 3.70 90.78 0.17 2.92 90.42 0.44
Ireland 1.52 87.03 0.03 2.14 93.68 0.31 2.40 91.91 0.84
Italy 2.60 80.10 0.02 4.76 89.40 0.18 5.85 90.28 0.55
Luxembourg 3.74 83.80 0.16 4.12 91.31 0.23 3.98 92.20 0.20
Netherlands 0.10 91.16 0.03 0.27 91.65 0.04 0.37 90.84 0.41
Portugal 3.99 92.50 0.04 3.02 94.88 0.17 2.26 95.79 0.33
65
Table B.4: Contribution to Welfare Loss
Var (output) Var (inflation) Total
Austria 3.1071 0.0066 3.1137
Belgium 0.0055 0.0004 0.0059
Germany 0.2578 0.0000 0.2578
Spain 0.1433 0.0001 0.1434
Finland 0.0097 0.0006 0.0103
France 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008
Ireland 1.1384 0.0001 1.1385
Italy 0.0480 0.0001 0.0481
Luxembourg 0.4020 0.0002 0.4022
Netherlands 0.1027 0.0004 0.1031
Portugal 0.0346 0.0001 0.0347
Note: The results are reported for a 240 period simulation.
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Table B.5: Aggregate Taylor Rule - Benchmark Specification
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
α 0.17 0.31 1.18
ρ 0.83 0.90 0.97
β 2.02 3.01 8.36
γ -1.05 0.02 0.25
Note: The table reports the results from 80,000 simulated draws for the aggregate Taylor Rule as in benchmark
specification (3.3). More specifically the exact equation corresponds to rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)βpiet+n +
(1 − ρ)γyet + t, where pit+n is the inflation rate between t and t + n = t + 12 calculated as (ln(HICPt+n) −
ln(HICPt))/n. The acceptance probability is 65%, while σ = 5× 10−7.
Table B.6: Aggregate Taylor Rule - Alternative Specification
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
α 0.17 0.30 0.90
ρ 0.82 0.90 0.97
β -10.15 -3.69 1.79
γ -5.59 0.04 2.75
φ 1.12 2.08 5.77
Note: The table reports the results from 80,000 simulated draws for the aggregate Taylor Rule as in the
alternative specification (3.5). More specifically the exact equation corresponds to rt = (1 − ρ)α + ρrt−1 +
(1 − ρ)βpit+n + (1 − ρ)γxt + (1 − ρ)κqt+n + ut, where pit+n is the inflation rate between t and t + n = t + 12
calculated as (ln(HICPt+n) − ln(HICPt))/n, qt+n is calculated similarly. The acceptance probability is 65%,
while σ = 3.5× 10−7.
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Table B.7: Disaggregate Taylor Rule - Benchmark Specification
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
α 0.05 0.14 1.38
ρ 0.38 0.78 0.98
β - EA 1.10 3.05 22.74
β - BE 0.51 2.64 26.63
β - DE 1.03 4.69 48.61
β - ES -34.17 -4.02 -1.34
β - FR -44.44 -4.30 -1.09
β - IT -1.38 1.13 9.67
β - NL 0.31 1.52 15.56
γ - EA -4.67 -0.19 4.75
γ - BE -1.09 -0.00 0.96
γ - DE -3.42 -0.29 1.05
γ - ES -6.75 -0.01 6.67
γ - FR -6.40 0.59 5.35
γ - IT -6.24 0.03 6.45
γ - NL -2.64 0.22 2.54
Note: The table reports the results from 80,000 simulated draws for the aggregate Taylor Rule as in benchmark
specification (3.3). More specifically the exact equation corresponds to rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(βpit+n +
l∑
i=1
βi(pi
i
t+n − pit+n)) + (1 − ρ)(γxt +
l∑
i=1
γi(x
i
t − xt)) + t, where pii,t+n is the inflation rate between t and
t+ n = t+ 12 calculated as (ln(HICPt+n) − ln(HICPt))/n for each country i. The acceptance probability is
63%, while σ = 7.5 × 10−10.
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Table B.8: Disaggregate Taylor Rule - Alternative Specification
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
α 0.06 0.15 1.53
ρ 0.46 0.80 0.98
β - EA -11.08 1.10 18.83
β - BE 0.14 2.63 31.73
β - DE -1.55 2.78 38.00
β - ES -39.37 -4.77 -2.16
β - FR -30.42 -2.10 1.78
β - IT -28.40 -2.57 -0.04
β - NL 0.67 1.97 18.37
γ - EA -5.03 -0.14 5.27
γ - BE -2.03 -0.02 2.46
γ - DE -3.83 0.16 3.42
γ - ES -4.87 0.39 3.24
γ - FR -7.32 0.55 4.79
γ - IT -6.45 0.40 7.99
γ - NL -2.06 -0.13 2.63
φ - EA 0.23 0.84 8.39
φ - BE -3.20 -0.33 -0.11
φ - DE 0.13 0.47 4.83
φ - ES -0.19 0.06 0.87
φ - FR -0.21 0.07 0.89
φ - IT -0.19 0.01 0.34
φ - NL -0.05 0.01 0.13
Note: The table reports the results from 80,000 simulated draws for the aggregate Taylor Rule as in benchmark
specification (3.3). More specifically the exact equation corresponds to rt = (1− ρ)α+ ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(βpit+n +∑l
i=1 βi(pi
i
t+n − pit+n)) + (1 − ρ)(γxt +
∑l
i=1 γi(x
i
t − xt)) + (1 − ρ)(κqt+n +
l∑
i=1
κi(q
i
t+n − qt+n)) + ut, where
pii,t+n is the inflation rate between t and t+ n = t+ 12 calculated as (ln(HICPt+n) − ln(HICPt))/n for each
country i, qi,t+n is calculated similarly. The acceptance probability is 68%, while σ = 1.6× 10−9.
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Table B.9: Robustness Study - with Survey of Professional Forecasters Data
A. Sample Size - 1999:Q1 - 2008:Q4
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
Aggregate Taylor Rule
α 10.06 13.51 20.56
ρ 0.69 0.77 0.85
β 2.72 4.20 6.31
γ 1.61 2.25 3.37
B. Sample Size - 1999:Q1 - 2010:Q2
5th percentile Median 95th percentile
Aggregate Taylor Rule
α 9.55 13.60 23.31
ρ 0.70 0.79 0.88
β 0.32 2.02 3.63
γ 0.84 1.30 2.24
Note: The results are for a benchmark specification similar to (3.1), where instead of the contemporaneous
output gap value I use one-year ahead expectations for the output growth. More specifically the exact equation
corresponds to rt = (1 − ρ)α + ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)βpiet+n + (1 − ρ)γyet+n + t, where piet+n and yet+n are the time t
expectations of the n = 12 period ahead inflation and output growth formed exogenously.
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Appendix C
Figures
Figure C.1: Frequency of Publications on the EMU, 1989-2002
Source: Jonung and Drea (2010).
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Figure C.2: Average monthly growth rate of industrial production index (IPI) 1999–2008:
deviation from Euro Area IPI growth rate (in percentage points)
Figure C.3: Average monthly (CPI) inflation 1999–2008: deviation from Euro Area (CPI)
inflation (in percentage points)
Source: Eurostat. The values for the IPI growth rate are calculated as the differences between seasonally
adjusted values of the country-specific and Euro Area (log) IPI growth rates averaged over the period
considered. The inflation rate reported is the change in the (log) Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices. The
series have been seasonally adjusted by X-11 filtering prior to calculating the inflation rate. Reported are the
differences between country-specific and Euro Area inflation rates averaged over the period considered.
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Figure C.4: Modal Impulse Response for Output
Note: The dashed lines represent the modal impulse response for the Euro Area, while the solid lines represent
the modal impulse responses for individual countries.
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Figure C.5: Modal Impulse Response for Inflation
Note: The dashed lines represent the modal impulse response for the Euro Area, while the solid lines represent
the modal impulse responses for individual countries.
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Figure C.6: Density Functions for Output
Note: The dashed lines represent the impulse response distribution for the Euro Area, while the solid lines
represent the impulse response distributions for individual countries.
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Figure C.7: Density Functions for Inflation
Note: The dashed lines represent the impulse response distribution for the Euro Area, while the solid lines
represent the impulse response distributions for individual countries.
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Figure C.8: Modal Impulse Response for Output - Empirical Prior
Note: The dashed lines represent the modal impulse response for the Euro Area, while the solid lines represent
the modal impulse responses for individual countries.
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Figure C.9: Modal Impulse Response for Inflation - Empirical Prior
Note: The dashed lines represent the modal impulse response for the Euro Area, while the solid lines represent
the modal impulse responses for individual countries.
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